Spot and Derivative Markets in Admission Control (1999) [13 citations — 3 self]
ftp://ftp.ctr.columbia.edu/CTR-Research/comet/publ
ftp://ftp.ctr.columbia.edu/CTR-Research/comet/publ
ftp://ftp.ctr.columbia.edu/CTR-Research/comet/publ
http://comet.columbia.edu/~aurel/papers/networking
CACHED:
Abstract:
We propose a new approach to pricing of capacity in service systems with blocking, using spot and derivative market mechanisms. A second-price auction among arrivals grouped in batches gives rise to the spot market of usage charges. A reservation guaranteeing access for an arbitrary duration with usage price below the bid can be made at any time before or during service, thus eliminating the risk -- inherent to the spot market -- of being dropped before service completion. We define the reservation as a hold option, which is analogous to the derivative financial instruments (e.g. options, futures) integrated over time. Based on a heavy-traffic diffusion model for the corresponding two-stage queueing system, we compute the reservation fee as the fair market price of a hold option. We validate this approach with simulations driven by a real traffic trace at a dial-up Internet access modem-pool.

