Message Authentication with MD5 (1995)
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author = {Burt Kaliski And and Burt Kaliski and Matt Robshaw},
title = {Message Authentication with MD5},
journal = {RSA Labs' CryptoBytes},
year = {1995},
volume = {1},
pages = {5--8}
}
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Abstract:
e the hash function doesn't have a key. A hash function can provide message authentication in a most satisfying manner when combined with a digital signature algorithm, which does have a key. But typical digital * Copyright 1995 RSA Laboratories, a division of RSA Data Security, Inc. All rights reserved. RSA Data Security, Inc. part number 003-903060-100-000-000. Reprinted from CryptoBytes, 1(1), 5-8, Spring 1995. 2 signature schemes have some performance overhead, which while acceptable for the periodic setup of communications sessions, is often too large on a message-by-message basis. Thus, the focus is on message authentication based on a shared secret key, which is ideally integrated into the hash function in some manner. As an illustration of the challenges, consider the "prefix" approach where the message authentication code is computed simply as the hash of the concatenation of the key and the message, where the key co
Citations
| 131 | The Security of Cipher Block Chaining – Bellare, Kilian, et al. - 1994 |
| 100 | XOR MACs: New methods for message authentication using finite pseudorandom functions – Bellare, Gu'erin, et al. - 1995 |
| 2 | A design principle for hash functions – Damgrd - 1989 |
| 1 | Keying MD5 - Message authentication via iterated pseudorandomness – Bellare, Canetti, et al. |
