Abstract

There is a substantial need of tools and methods for verification of security protocols due to the increasing use of distributed systems. We present a general framework for modelling infinite-state authentication protocols that allows an unbounded number of protocol participants. A method for verification by performing a backwards reachability analysis, where sets of insecure states are specified using constraints, is also presented. The method is illustrated by a model of the Needham-Schroeder public key protocol for which a security property is verified. Contents 1 Introduction 5 2 Preliminaries 8 2.1 What is Authentication? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 2.2 Protocol Components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 2.3 Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3 A Modelling Framework 11 3.1 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 3.2 The Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....

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