## Truthful Mechanisms for One-Parameter Agents (2001)

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Venue: | In Proc. of the 42nd IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science |

Citations: | 197 - 4 self |

### BibTeX

@INPROCEEDINGS{Archer01truthfulmechanisms,

author = {Aaron Archer and Eva Tardos},

title = {Truthful Mechanisms for One-Parameter Agents},

booktitle = {In Proc. of the 42nd IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science},

year = {2001},

pages = {482--491}

}

### Years of Citing Articles

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### Abstract

In this paper, we show how to design truthful (dominant strategy) mechanisms for several combinatorial problems where each agent's secret data is naturally expressed by a single positive real number. The goal of the mechanisms we consider is to allocate loads placed on the agents, and an agent's secret data is the cost she incurs per unit load. We give an exact characterization for the algorithms that can be used to design truthful mechanisms for such load balancing problems using appropriate side payments.

### Citations

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(Show Context)
Citation Context ... try to design mechanisms where each agent has a dominant strategy. However, it is easy to see that we lose no generality by restricting to mechansims in which agents directly reveal their parameters =-=[22]-=-. 3 Related work The economics and game theory literature contains an enormous body of work on mechanism design, also called implementation theory or the theory of incentives. See [22, ch. 23] or [26,... |

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Citation Context ...paymentssto the agents in this currency, and each agent aims to maximize the sum of her valuation and payment. The most famous positive result in this area is the Vickrey-ClarkeGroves (VCG) mechanism =-=[31, 4, 12]-=-. Nisan and Ronen [24] considered discrete optimization problems in this game theoretic context, where the correct data is not directly available to the algorithm. Instead, there are several economic ... |

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Citation Context .... Email: eva@cs.cornell.edu Research supported in part by NSF grant CCR-9700163 and ONR grant N00014-98-1-0589. decision. As indicated by Arrow's impossibility theorem for satisfactory voting systems =-=[2]-=-, this is a thorny problem. It is further complicated by the possibility that the participants (usually called players or agents) might try to manipulate the system by misrepresenting their preference... |

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Citation Context ...paymentssto the agents in this currency, and each agent aims to maximize the sum of her valuation and payment. The most famous positive result in this area is the Vickrey-ClarkeGroves (VCG) mechanism =-=[31, 4, 12]-=-. Nisan and Ronen [24] considered discrete optimization problems in this game theoretic context, where the correct data is not directly available to the algorithm. Instead, there are several economic ... |

647 |
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Citation Context ...paymentssto the agents in this currency, and each agent aims to maximize the sum of her valuation and payment. The most famous positive result in this area is the Vickrey-ClarkeGroves (VCG) mechanism =-=[31, 4, 12]-=-. Nisan and Ronen [24] considered discrete optimization problems in this game theoretic context, where the correct data is not directly available to the algorithm. Instead, there are several economic ... |

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Citation Context ...s currency, and each agent aims to maximize the sum of her valuation and payment. The most famous positive result in this area is the Vickrey-ClarkeGroves (VCG) mechanism [31, 4, 12]. Nisan and Ronen =-=[24]-=- considered discrete optimization problems in this game theoretic context, where the correct data is not directly available to the algorithm. Instead, there are several economic agents who each know s... |

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Citation Context ...sm design, also called implementation theory or the theory of incentives. See [22, ch. 23] or [26, ch. 10] for an introduction to the field, or the surveys [20, 13]. The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem =-=[8, 28]-=- is the main negative result, which states that truthful non-dictatorial mechanisms do not exist, when the players' domain of possible preferences is sufficiently rich. In light of this, it is common ... |

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Citation Context ...sm design, also called implementation theory or the theory of incentives. See [22, ch. 23] or [26, ch. 10] for an introduction to the field, or the surveys [20, 13]. The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem =-=[8, 28]-=- is the main negative result, which states that truthful non-dictatorial mechanisms do not exist, when the players' domain of possible preferences is sufficiently rich. In light of this, it is common ... |

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Citation Context ... welfare functions. For example, the shortest path in a graph with respect to edge costs maximizes social welfare because it minimizes the total cost incurred. For the utilitarian objective function, =-=[11]-=- proves that VCG is the only optimal truthful mechanism. In the case of one-parameter agents with some differentiability assumptions, [19] gives a simplified proof. Much work has addressed computation... |

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Microeconomic Theory
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Citation Context ... try to design mechanisms where each agent has a dominant strategy. However, it is easy to see that we lose no generality by restricting to mechansims in which agents directly reveal their parameters =-=[22]-=-. 3 Related work The economics and game theory literature contains an enormous body of work on mechanism design, also called implementation theory or the theory of incentives. See [22, ch. 23] or [26,... |

237 |
Theory of Scheduling
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Citation Context ...ch we can apply Theorems 4.2 and 4.4. The problem of scheduling on related machines to minimize the sum of completion times, commonly denoted Qjj P C j , can be solved optimally by a simple algorithm =-=[5]-=-. We can prove that this algorithm results in work curves that decrease monotonically to zero. Thus, by Theorems 4.2 and 4.4, we obtain a truthful mechanism that solves Qjj P C j exactly and satisfies... |

193 | Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms - Nisan, Ronen - 2000 |

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Citation Context ...lems in computer science, suggesting general objective functions. Some subsequent algorithmically-oriented work involves costsharing mechanisms for multicast trees [7, 17], auctions for digital goods =-=[10]-=-, and the use of auctions to elicit information [30]. The digital goods paper [10] is notable because it explicitly chooses not to maximize the social welfare. In their model, the marginal cost of cre... |

123 | Applications of Approximation Algorithms to Cooperative Games
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Citation Context ...k to some standard optimization problems in computer science, suggesting general objective functions. Some subsequent algorithmically-oriented work involves costsharing mechanisms for multicast trees =-=[7, 17]-=-, auctions for digital goods [10], and the use of auctions to elicit information [30]. The digital goods paper [10] is notable because it explicitly chooses not to maximize the social welfare. In thei... |

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Citation Context ... first note that our problem is equivalent to bin packing with uneven bins, which leads to a lower bound on C max , the optimal makespan. This bound is implicit in the 3 2 -approximation algorithm of =-=[29]-=-. Given a guess T at the value of C max , we create a bin of size T=b i for each machinesi. The size of a machine's bin is the maximum load we can assign to it if the machine is to finish all its jobs... |

89 |
A polynomial approximation scheme for scheduling on uniform processors: Using the dual approximation approach
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Citation Context ... a randomized 3-approximation mechanism. The problem is NPcomplete, but a greedy load-balancing scheme provides a 2-approximation, and there is also a PTAS 1 based on rounding and dynamic programming =-=[16]-=-. However, these types of combinatorial approximation algorithms do not provide monotone work-curves, as the effect of changing the parameter of a single agent is hard to control throughout the algori... |

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(Show Context)
Citation Context ...side, it also shows that if the mechanism lets the agents suggest ways to improve the output, these mechanisms can be made to satisfy a modified notion of truthfulness. A different approach, taken in =-=[21]-=-, is to use a heuristic for the output and use a non-VCG payment scheme to induce truth-telling. They consider a simple type of auction in which computing the socially optimal assignment of goods is h... |

61 |
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(Show Context)
Citation Context ...mmai ; u)du: (4) Remarks Our characterization of truthful mechanisms in terms of monotone decreasing outputs should not be confused with other uses of the word "monotone." In particular, a t=-=heorem in [6] character-=-izes truthful mechanisms in terms of "independent person-by-person monotonicity" (IPM). In our context, IPM would be a property of the output and payments together, whereas the beauty of The... |

59 | Online facility location
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(Show Context)
Citation Context ...ute each payment easily, as it just involves finding the threshold bid at which a facility would no longer be open (i.e. where w i (b \Gammai ; \Delta) jumps from 1 to 0). We can use the algorithm of =-=[23]-=- as the basis for a truthful mechanism for facility location in an arbitrary metric space. Since it considers each facility one at a time and opens it with probability inversely proportional to its co... |

50 | Cooperative facility location games
- GOEMANS, SKUTELLA
- 2000
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...owever, there are some special cases that can be solved in polynomial time, such as if the facilities and customers lie on a line, circle, or tree. Slight generalizations of these cases are solved in =-=[9]-=-. In these cases, we can also compute each payment easily, as it just involves finding the threshold bid at which a facility would no longer be open (i.e. where w i (b \Gammai ; \Delta) jumps from 1 t... |

27 | Mechanism design for resource bounded agents
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(Show Context)
Citation Context ...hard to compute, since it requires finding an optimal output. One approach is to compute the output using a fast heuristic, and still try to use the VCG payment scheme. Such mechanisms are studied in =-=[18]-=-, which gives three properties of the allocation algorithm that will allow the VCG payments to induce truth-telling. However, [25] exhibits a broad class of problems for which no mechanism that uses V... |

24 |
The theory of incentives: an overview
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(Show Context)
Citation Context ...contains an enormous body of work on mechanism design, also called implementation theory or the theory of incentives. See [22, ch. 23] or [26, ch. 10] for an introduction to the field, or the surveys =-=[20, 13]-=-. The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem [8, 28] is the main negative result, which states that truthful non-dictatorial mechanisms do not exist, when the players' domain of possible preferences is suffici... |

23 | Vickrey pricing in network routing: Fast payment computation
- Hershberger, Suri
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...ull version of this paper. While all of these papers depart from the standard VCG mechanism, they still aim to maximize the utilitarian objective, whereas we look at general objective functions. Both =-=[14]-=- and [3] consider cases where the VCG mechanism can be computed in polynomial time, and address how to speed up this run time. While we are interested in polytime computable mechanisms, we make no att... |

20 |
A Differential Approach to Dominant Strategy Mechanisms
- Laffont, Maskin
- 1980
(Show Context)
Citation Context ... total cost incurred. For the utilitarian objective function, [11] proves that VCG is the only optimal truthful mechanism. In the case of one-parameter agents with some differentiability assumptions, =-=[19]-=- gives a simplified proof. Much work has addressed computational issues surrounding VCG mechanisms. The main difficulty is that in many settings, the VCG mechanism is NP-hard to compute, since it requ... |

18 |
Sharing the cost of muliticast transmissions
- Feigenbaum, Papadimitriou, et al.
- 2001
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...k to some standard optimization problems in computer science, suggesting general objective functions. Some subsequent algorithmically-oriented work involves costsharing mechanisms for multicast trees =-=[7, 17]-=-, auctions for digital goods [10], and the use of auctions to elicit information [30]. The digital goods paper [10] is notable because it explicitly chooses not to maximize the social welfare. In thei... |

16 | Algorithms for rational agents
- Ronen
- 2000
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...ood is negligible, so the socially optimal allocation is to sell this good to everyone, but they do not do this because it generates no revenue. Highlighting the fact that revenue is a major concern, =-=[27]-=- suggests looking at auctions of a single good that do not necessarily maximize the social welfare, and characterizes all truthful mechanisms for this problem. His characterization is a special case o... |

11 | On rational computability and communication complexity
- Shoham, Tennenholtz
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...ve functions. Some subsequent algorithmically-oriented work involves costsharing mechanisms for multicast trees [7, 17], auctions for digital goods [10], and the use of auctions to elicit information =-=[30]-=-. The digital goods paper [10] is notable because it explicitly chooses not to maximize the social welfare. In their model, the marginal cost of creating an extra copy of the good is negligible, so th... |

4 |
Linear programming and vickrey auctions. Unpublished manuscript
- Bikhchandani, Vries, et al.
- 2001
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...on of this paper. While all of these papers depart from the standard VCG mechanism, they still aim to maximize the utilitarian objective, whereas we look at general objective functions. Both [14] and =-=[3]-=- consider cases where the VCG mechanism can be computed in polynomial time, and address how to speed up this run time. While we are interested in polytime computable mechanisms, we make no attempt to ... |

4 |
On theories of incentive compatible choice with compensation
- Groves
- 1980
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...contains an enormous body of work on mechanism design, also called implementation theory or the theory of incentives. See [22, ch. 23] or [26, ch. 10] for an introduction to the field, or the surveys =-=[20, 13]-=-. The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem [8, 28] is the main negative result, which states that truthful non-dictatorial mechanisms do not exist, when the players' domain of possible preferences is suffici... |

2 |
Frugal path mechanisms. Unpublished manuscript
- Archer, Tardos
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...aves poorly in this regard, as some cases force the mechanism to pay\Omega\Gamma n) times the cost of the shortest path, even when there is an alternate path of similar cost. Surprisingly, we show in =-=[1]-=- that every reasonable mechanism for this problem exhibits this bad behavior. In contrast, we show here that our mechanism for QjjCmax pays out only a logarithmic factor more than the actual costs inc... |