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Truthful Mechanisms for One-Parameter Agents (2001) [112 citations — 3 self]

by Aaron Archer ,  Eva Tardos
In Proc. of the 42nd IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
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Abstract:

In this paper, we show how to design truthful (dominant strategy) mechanisms for several combinatorial problems where each agent's secret data is naturally expressed by a single positive real number. The goal of the mechanisms we consider is to allocate loads placed on the agents, and an agent's secret data is the cost she incurs per unit load. We give an exact characterization for the algorithms that can be used to design truthful mechanisms for such load balancing problems using appropriate side payments.

Citations

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