Introduction 2. Applications 2.1. Arms Control and Disarmament 2.2. Accounting and Auditing in Economics 2.3. Environmental Control 2.4. Miscellaneous Models 3. Statistical Decisions 3.1. General Game and Analysis 3.2. Material Accountancy 3.3. Data Verification 4. Sequential Inspections 4.1. Recursive Inspection Games 4.2. Timeliness Games 5. Inspector Leadership 5.1. Definition and Introductory Examples 5.2. Announced Inspection Strategy 6. Conclusions References This work was supported by the German-Israeli Foundation (G.I.F.) and by the Volkswagen Foundation. 1. Introduction Inspection games form an applied field of game theory. An inspection game is a mathematical model of a situation where an inspector verifies that another party, called inspectee, adheres to certain legal rules. This legal behavior may be defined by an arms control treaty, for example,
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