Corporate Governance and Merger Activity in the United States: Making Sense of the 1980s and 1990s
| Venue: | Journal of Economic Perspectives 15:2 (Spring |
| Citations: | 38 - 1 self |
BibTeX
@ARTICLE{Holmstrom_corporategovernance,
author = {Bengt Holmstrom and Steven N. Kaplan},
title = {Corporate Governance and Merger Activity in the United States: Making Sense of the 1980s and 1990s},
journal = {Journal of Economic Perspectives 15:2 (Spring},
year = {},
pages = {121--144}
}
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Abstract
Corporate governance in the United States changed dramatically throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Before 1980, corporate governance—meaning the mechanisms by which corporations and their managers are governed—was relatively inactive. Then, the 1980s ushered in a large wave of merger, takeover and restructuring activity. This activity was distinguished by its use of leverage and hostility. The use of leverage was so great that from 1984 to 1990, more than $500 billion of equity was retired on net, as corporations repurchased their own shares, borrowed to finance takeovers, and were taken private in leveraged buyouts. Corporate leverage increased substantially. Leveraged buyouts were extreme in this respect with debt levels typically exceeding 80 percent of total capital. The 1980s also saw the emergence of the hostile takeover and the corporate raider. Raiders like Carl Icahn and T. Boone Pickens became household names. Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) report that nearly half of all major U.S. corporations received a takeover offer in the 1980s. In addition, many firms that were not taken over restructured in response to hostile pressure to make themselves less attractive targets. In the 1990s, the pattern of corporate governance activity changed again. After a steep but brief drop in merger activity around 1990, takeovers rebounded to the levels of the 1980s. Leverage and hostility, however, declined substantially. At the same time, other corporate governance mechanisms began to play a larger role,







