Finite-State Analysis of SSL 3.0 (1998)
| Venue: | In 7 th USENIX Security Symp |
| Citations: | 71 - 11 self |
BibTeX
@INPROCEEDINGS{Mitchell98finite-stateanalysis,
author = {John C. Mitchell and Vitaly Shmatikov and Ulrich Stern and John C. Mitchell and Vitaly Shmatikov and Ulrich Stern},
title = {Finite-State Analysis of SSL 3.0},
booktitle = {In 7 th USENIX Security Symp},
year = {1998},
pages = {201--216}
}
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Abstract
The Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) protocol is analyzed using a nite-state enumeration tool called Mur'. The analysis is presented using a sequence of incremental approximations to the SSL 3.0 handshake protocol. Each simpli ed protocol is \modelchecked" using Mur', with the next protocol in the sequence obtained by correcting errors that Mur' nds automatically. This process identi es the main shortcomings in SSL 2.0 that led to the design of SSL 3.0, as well as a few anomalies in the protocol that is used toresume a session in SSL 3.0. In addition to some insight into SSL, this study demonstrates the feasibility of using formal methods to analyze commercial protocols. 1
Citations
| 109 | The SSL protocol version 3.0 - Freier, Karlton, et al. - 1996 |
| 45 | HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication,” Internet RFC 2104 - Krawczyk, Bellare, et al. - 1997 |
| 8 | The Mur' veri cation system - Dill - 1996 |
| 4 | Formal speci cation of abstract memory models - Dill, Park, et al. - 1993 |
| 3 | A Formal Analysis of the Secure Sockets Layer Protocol - Dietrich - 1997 |
