## Incentive compatible budget elicitation in multi-unit auctions (2010)

Venue: | In Proceedings of the Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA |

Citations: | 8 - 4 self |

### BibTeX

@INPROCEEDINGS{Bhattacharya10incentivecompatible,

author = {Sayan Bhattacharya and Vincent Conitzer and Kamesh Munagala and Lirong Xia},

title = {Incentive compatible budget elicitation in multi-unit auctions},

booktitle = {In Proceedings of the Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA},

year = {2010},

pages = {554--572}

}

### OpenURL

### Abstract

In this paper, we consider the problem of designing incentive compatible auctions for multiple (homogeneous) units of a good, when bidders have private valuations and private budget constraints. When only the valuations are private and the budgets are public, Dobzinski et al [8] show that the adaptive clinching auction is the unique incentive-compatible auction achieving Pareto-optimality. They further show that this auction is not truthful with private budgets, so that there is no deterministic Pareto-optimal auction with private budgets. Our main contribution is to show the following Budget Monotonicity property of this auction: When there is only one infinitely divisible good, a bidder cannot improve her utility by reporting a budget smaller than the truth. This implies that the adaptive clinching auction is incentive

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Citation Context ...pectrum auctions. Therefore, analyzing properties of such auctions is not only of theoretical interest, but might pave the way for better auction design in practice. Bayesian Setting. In this setting =-=[14]-=-, the auctioneer maintains independent distributions on the possible valuations and budgets for each bidder, and is interested in designing a poly-time computable mechanism for optimizing expected rev... |

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Citation Context ...ng by all agents. Practical Implications. The primary motivation for studying multi-unit auctions with budget constraints is the Google TV ad system [9]. Furthermore, related ascending price auctions =-=[2, 3, 13]-=- are used in the FCC spectrum auctions. Therefore, analyzing properties of such auctions is not only of theoretical interest, but might pave the way for better auction design in practice. Bayesian Set... |

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Citation Context ...ng by all agents. Practical Implications. The primary motivation for studying multi-unit auctions with budget constraints is the Google TV ad system [9]. Furthermore, related ascending price auctions =-=[2, 3, 13]-=- are used in the FCC spectrum auctions. Therefore, analyzing properties of such auctions is not only of theoretical interest, but might pave the way for better auction design in practice. Bayesian Set... |

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Citation Context ...tions for multiple (homogeneous) units of a good, when bidders have private valuations and private budget constraints. When only the valuations are private and the budgets are public, Dobzinski et al =-=[8]-=- show that the adaptive clinching auction is the unique incentive-compatible auction achieving Pareto-optimality. They further show that this auction is not truthful with private budgets, so that ther... |

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Citation Context ...ial time computation, since the optimal mechanism can be encoded as an exponential size linear program. The optimal auction that only requires ex-interim (IC) and (VP) can be encoded as a polymatroid =-=[4, 7, 12, 15]-=- that can be solved using the Ellipsoid algorithm. However, it is not clear how to compute the optimal dominant strategy mechanism (which is (VP) and (IC) even when a bidder is aware of other bidders’... |

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Citation Context ...ith private budgets, and hence, this auction improves the competitive ratio in [1] by a factor of 4, and like the auction in [5], is asymptotically optimal. Independently of this work, Hafalir et al. =-=[11]-=- also consider the problem of designing Pareto-optimal mechanisms with private budgets via randomization, and present a different mechanism termed Sort-Cut. However, unlike our result, their mechanism... |

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Citation Context ...hence only Paretooptimal conditioned on truth-telling by all agents. Practical Implications. The primary motivation for studying multi-unit auctions with budget constraints is the Google TV ad system =-=[9]-=-. Furthermore, related ascending price auctions [2, 3, 13] are used in the FCC spectrum auctions. Therefore, analyzing properties of such auctions is not only of theoretical interest, but might pave t... |