D.: Zero-knowledge in the applied pi-calculus and automated verification of the direct anonymous attestation protocol
| Venue: | In: IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP 08). (2008) 202–215 Preprint on IACR ePrint 2007/289 |
| Citations: | 19 - 0 self |
BibTeX
@INPROCEEDINGS{Backes_d.:zero-knowledge,
author = {Michael Backes and Matteo Maffei and Dominique Unruh},
title = {D.: Zero-knowledge in the applied pi-calculus and automated verification of the direct anonymous attestation protocol},
booktitle = {In: IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP 08). (2008) 202–215 Preprint on IACR ePrint 2007/289},
year = {}
}
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Abstract
We devise an abstraction of zero-knowledge protocols that is accessible to a fully mechanized analysis. The abstraction is formalized within the applied pi-calculus using a novel equational theory that abstractly characterizes the cryptographic semantics of zero-knowledge proofs. We present an encoding from the equational theory into a convergent rewriting system that is suitable for the automated protocol verifier ProVerif. The encoding is sound and fully automated. We successfully used ProVerif to obtain the first mechanized analysis of the Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA) protocol. This required us to devise novel abstractions of sophisticated cryptographic security definitions based on interactive games. The analysis reported a novel attack on DAA that was overlooked in its existing cryptographic security proof. We propose a revised variant of DAA that we successfully prove secure using ProVerif. 1
