Sequential procurement auctions (1986)
by
Richard Luton
,
R. Preston Mcafee
| Venue: | Journal of Public Economics |
| Citations: | 7 - 0 self |
BibTeX
@ARTICLE{Luton86sequentialprocurement,
author = {Richard Luton and R. Preston Mcafee},
title = {Sequential procurement auctions},
journal = {Journal of Public Economics},
year = {1986},
pages = {181--195}
}
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Abstract
Two auctions are held in sequence with the possibility of learning between the second and the first. The buyer optimally chooses to discriminate against the winner of the first auction in the second. The optimal mechanism has a discontinuity in the winner’s second bid; this strictly dominates a sequence of independent sealed bid auctions. 1.
Citations
| 659 | Optimal Auction Design - Myerson - 1981 |
| 68 | 1982], “Optimal Coordination Mechanisms in Generalized PrincipalAgent Problems - Myerson |
| 53 | A theory of auctions and competitive bidding, Econometrica 50 - Milgrom, Weber - 1982 |
| 40 | Bundling Decisions by a Multiproduct Monopolist with Incomplete Information,” Econometrica - Palfrey - 1983 |
| 30 | Resource allocation under asymmetric information - Harris, Townsend - 1981 |
| 23 | Selling to Risk Averse Buyers with Unobservable Tastes - Matthews - 1983 |
| 1 | Discrimination in auctions, Discussion paper no - McAfee, McMillan - 1985 |
