Abstract

Many security protocols have appeared in the literature, with aims such as agreeing upon a cryptographic key, or achieving authentication. However, many of these have been shown to be flawed. In this paper we present a number of new attacks upon security protocols, and discuss ways in which we may avoid designing incorrect protocols in the future. 1 Introduction Many security protocols have appeared in the literature; these have various aims, such as agreeing upon a cryptographic key, or achieving authentication, where each agent becomes assured of the other's identity. Unfortunately, a large proportion of these protocols are subject to attacks, leading to them not correctly achieving their goals. In this paper, we present a few more attacks upon such protocols. The main point of this paper is to highlight the fact that, despite much research on the subject, many insecure protocols are still being produced. Further, most of the weaknesses that allow the attacks are well known. Our hop...

Citations

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