Towards a Completeness Result for Model Checking of Security Protocols (1999)
| Venue: | Journal of Computer Security |
| Citations: | 104 - 4 self |
BibTeX
@INPROCEEDINGS{Lowe99towardsa,
author = {Gavin Lowe},
title = {Towards a Completeness Result for Model Checking of Security Protocols},
booktitle = {Journal of Computer Security},
year = {1999},
pages = {96--105},
publisher = {Society Press}
}
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Abstract
Model checking approaches to the analysis of security protocols have proved remarkably successful. The basic approach is to produce a model of a small system running the protocol, together with a model of the most general intruder who can interact with the protocol, and then to use a state exploration tool to search for attacks. This has led to a number of new attacks upon protocols being discovered. However, if no attack is found, this only tells us that there is no attack upon the small system we modelled; there may be an attack upon some larger system. This is the question we consider in this paper: we prove that under certain conditions on the protocol and the environment in which it operates, if there is no attack upon a particular small system (with one honest agent for each role of the protocol) leading to a breach of secrecy, then there is no attack on any larger system leading to a breach of secrecy.
