## Communication Complexity and Secure Function Evaluation (2001)

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Citations: | 15 - 1 self |

### BibTeX

@MISC{Naor01communicationcomplexity,

author = {Moni Naor and Kobbi Nissim},

title = {Communication Complexity and Secure Function Evaluation},

year = {2001}

}

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### Abstract

A secure function evaluation protocol allows two parties to jointly compute a function f(x; y) of their inputs in a manner not leaking more information than necessary. A major result in this field is: "any function f that can be computed using polynomial resources can be computed securely using polynomial resources" (where `resources' refers to communication and computation). This result follows by a general transformation from any circuit for f to a secure protocol that evaluates f . Although the resources used by protocols resulting from this transformation are polynomial in the circuit size, they are much higher (in general) than those required for an insecure computation of f . For the design of efficient secure protocols we suggest two new methodologies, that differ with respect to their underlying computational models. In one methodology we utilize the communication complexity tree (or branching program) representation of f . We start with an efficient (insecure) protocol for f and transform it into a secure protocol. In other words, "any function f that can be computed using communication complexity c can be can be computed securely using communication complexity that is polynomial in c and a security parameter". The second methodology uses the circuit computing f , enhanced with look-up tables as its underlying computational model. It is possible to simulate any RAM machine in this model with polylogarithmic blowup. Hence it is possible to start with a computation of f on a RAM machine and transform it into a secure protocol. We show many applications of these new methodologies resulting in protocols efficient either in communication or in computation. In particular, we exemplify a protocol for the "millionaires problem", where two partici...

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Citation Context ...rations such as accessing a single element from a table result in a relatively large penalty in the circuit size. More specifically, if one follows the ‘garbled circuit’ construction, as discussed in =-=[43]-=-, then 1 One of the first problems considered is Yao’s “millionaires problem” [49], where two participants want to check which one has a larger value but leak no other information. Note that the name ... |

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Citation Context ...impact on the complexity of its secure function evaluation protocol. Some representations of f, other than Boolean circuits were used in previous works. To name a few examples, Kilian [28] as well as =-=[23, 5]-=- used permutation branching programs, appealing to Barrington’s Theorem. In the multiparty computation with an honest majority setting, Ben-Or et el. [9], followed by many of the works in the area, us... |

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Citation Context ... Machine T may be simulated by an oblivious Turing Machine – where the head position, as a function of time, is independent of the input. The oblivious simulation results in a polylogarithmic blow-up =-=[45]-=-. (See further discussion in Section 5.1.1.) The situation regarding circuits vs. RAM machines is not known. Since a RAM machine M running in time T(n) using space S(n) may be simulated by a Turing Ma... |

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Citation Context ...· S(n)). Simulation by oblivious RAM The access pattern of an oblivious machine does not depend on its input, hence it hides all information about the input (except its size). Goldreich and Ostrovsky =-=[19, 24]-=- utilized this property of oblivious machines to protect software from leaking its memory access sequence. However, to allow for efficient simulation of a RAM machine by oblivious RAM machine, they ex... |

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Citation Context ...d [26] used a representation of f as a product of matrices over a large enough field. Beaver et al. [8] used the representation of f as a low degree polynomial. A recent work by Ishai and Kushilevitz =-=[27]-=- introduced a representation of functions via randomizing polynomials and used it to construct round-efficient secure multiparty protocols. Communication complexity and privacy The question of whether... |

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Citation Context ... Theorem. In the multiparty computation with an honest majority setting, Ben-Or et el. [9], followed by many of the works in the area, used a representation of f by an algebraic circuit. Feige et al. =-=[14]-=- and [26] used a representation of f as a product of matrices over a large enough field. Beaver et al. [8] used the representation of f as a low degree polynomial. A recent work by Ishai and Kushilevi... |

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Citation Context ... read and write operations to be polylogarithmic in s, resting in a polylogarithmic blowup. Our constructions are similar in nature to that of Goldreich and Ostrovsky [19, 24] and Ostrovsky and Shoup =-=[44]-=-. A similar luck of efficiency problem was addressed by Rosenblum and Ousterhout [46] in the context of file systems. They suggest log-structured file systems that optimize write operations to the fil... |

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Citation Context ...aluation protocols is dominated by the cost of the oblivious transfer invocations. Intuitively, the number of oblivious transfer invocations is a good measure for the efficiency of a protocol. Beaver =-=[4]-=- showed that it is possible to implement poly(k) oblivious transfers from an initial “seed” of just k oblivious transfers, assuming only the existence of one-way functions (where k is a security param... |

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Citation Context ...dered in the information theoretic setting by Kushilevitz 4 . In the two party case only very special functions have an information theoretic private protocol (see characterization in [32] and Kilian =-=[29]-=-). For functions that have private protocols in the information theoretic setting, Kushilevitz [32] showed that their secure version protocol may be much more expensive than their insecure version. Th... |

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Citation Context ...arties. Therefore one can also have a round preserving protocol. Example Applying the Construction 4.1 to the Hamming distance protocol in Figure 2 we get: j = 0 ¯y1 = [1, 2] ¯x2 = [1, 3, 5, 7] ¯y3 = =-=[1, 2, 5, 6, 9, 10, 13, 14]-=- ¯x4 = [0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 2, 1, 2, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 2,1, 2]. Going through the lists we get: x4[y3[x2[y1[j]]]] = x4[y3[x2[y1[0]]]] = x4[y3[x2[1]]] = x4[y3[3]] = x4[6] = 1. 4.2.1 Simple applications Computi... |

26 | Private simultaneous messages protocols with applications
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Citation Context ... In the multiparty computation with an honest majority setting, Ben-Or et el. [9], followed by many of the works in the area, used a representation of f by an algebraic circuit. Feige et al. [14] and =-=[26]-=- used a representation of f as a product of matrices over a large enough field. Beaver et al. [8] used the representation of f as a low degree polynomial. A recent work by Ishai and Kushilevitz [27] i... |

20 |
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Citation Context ...ication complexity polylog(n) · poly(k). This problem has not been explicitly treated in the past. We observe however that the construction of zero knowledge arguments for NP by Kilian [30] (see also =-=[31]-=-), combined with the PCP system of Arora et al. [3] gives the desired properties. Kilian’s construction is based on the PCP Theorem [3] and uses a commitment scheme that allows to open the commitment ... |

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Citation Context ...one is interested in a low computational protocol, then the overhead can be as little as one exponentiation plus w private-key operations, using the first scheme in [42]. 7 Recently, Kiayias and Yung =-=[37]-=- presented a new polylogarithmic communication PIR scheme. 8 A similar construction was suggested by Aiello, Ishai and Reingold [1]. 9 Φ-hiding for the PIR scheme [12], and DDH for [42]. 8Counting ob... |

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Citation Context ...es. Property testing A great source of applications for circuits with LUT is property testing, where a (typically large) object is locally queried in order to check whether some global property holds =-=[7, 47, 22]-=-. I.e. the number of queries to the object is very small with respect to the object size (at the extreme - independent of the object size). The object is assumed either to have the property or to be f... |

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Citation Context ...arties. Therefore one can also have a round preserving protocol. Example Applying the Construction 4.1 to the Hamming distance protocol in Figure 2 we get: j = 0 ¯y1 = [1, 2] ¯x2 = [1, 3, 5, 7] ¯y3 = =-=[1, 2, 5, 6, 9, 10, 13, 14]-=- ¯x4 = [0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 2, 1, 2, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 2,1, 2]. Going through the lists we get: x4[y3[x2[y1[j]]]] = x4[y3[x2[y1[0]]]] = x4[y3[x2[1]]] = x4[y3[3]] = x4[6] = 1. 4.2.1 Simple applications Computi... |

9 |
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Citation Context ...ot depend on the inputs of the parties. Therefore one can also have a round preserving protocol. Example Applying the Construction 4.1 to the Hamming distance protocol in Figure 2 we get: j = 0 ¯y1 = =-=[1, 2]-=- ¯x2 = [1, 3, 5, 7] ¯y3 = [1, 2, 5, 6, 9, 10, 13, 14] ¯x4 = [0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 2, 1, 2, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 2,1, 2]. Going through the lists we get: x4[y3[x2[y1[j]]]] = x4[y3[x2[y1[0]]]] = x4[y3[x2[1]]] = x4[... |

7 |
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2 |
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Citation Context ...ossible to create private protocols for some of these tasks, without resorting to the garbled circuit transformation, resulting in protocols with much lower communication complexity, see [16, 17] and =-=[38]-=-. As a consequence of our work, many more of these algorithms can be evaluated securely with low communication overhead. Impact of the representation of f on the complexity of secure function evaluati... |

1 |
Private communication
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Citation Context ...e ‘security’ parameter), and thus the circuits computing them are small. For these components, one may use for example the garbles circuit construction. Computing on encrypted data Halevi and Mironov =-=[25, 39]-=- noted that some popular private-key encryption functions (e.g. Data Encryption Standard – DES and Advanced Encryption Standard – AES) are defined with look-up tables, hence they are readily expressib... |

1 |
Private communication
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Citation Context ...e ‘security’ parameter), and thus the circuits computing them are small. For these components, one may use for example the garbles circuit construction. Computing on encrypted data Halevi and Mironov =-=[25, 39]-=- noted that some popular private-key encryption functions (e.g. Data Encryption Standard – DES and Advanced Encryption Standard – AES) are defined with look-up tables, hence they are readily expressib... |

1 |
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Citation Context ... that it is possible to create private protocols for some of these tasks, without resorting to the garbled circuit transformation, resulting in protocols with much lower communication complexity, see =-=[16, 17]-=- and [38]. As a consequence of our work, many more of these algorithms can be evaluated securely with low communication overhead. Impact of the representation of f on the complexity of secure function... |