## About Generic Conversions from any Weakly Secure Encryption Scheme into a Chosen-Ciphertext Secure Scheme (2001)

Venue: | In Proceedings of the Fourth Conference on Algebraic Geometry, Number Theory, Coding Theory and Cryptography |

Citations: | 1 - 1 self |

### BibTeX

@INPROCEEDINGS{Pointcheval01aboutgeneric,

author = {David Pointcheval},

title = {About Generic Conversions from any Weakly Secure Encryption Scheme into a Chosen-Ciphertext Secure Scheme},

booktitle = {In Proceedings of the Fourth Conference on Algebraic Geometry, Number Theory, Coding Theory and Cryptography},

year = {2001},

pages = {145--162}

}

### OpenURL

### Abstract

Abstract. Since the appearance of public-key cryptography in the seminal Diffie-Hellman paper, many schemes have been proposed, but many have been broken. Indeed, for many people, the simple fact that a cryptographic algorithm withstands cryptanalytic attacks for several years is considered as a kind of validation. But some schemes took a long time before being widely studied, and maybe thereafter being broken. A much more convincing line of research has tried to provide “provable ” security for cryptographic protocols, in a complexity theory sense: if one can break the cryptographic protocol, one can efficiently solve the underlying problem. Unfortunately, very few practical schemes can be proven in this so-called “standard model ” because such a security level rarely meets with efficiency. A convenient way to achieve some kind of validation of efficient schemes has been to identify some concrete cryptographic objects with ideal random ones: hash functions are considered as behaving like random functions, in the so-called “random oracle model”, and groups are used as black-box groups, in which one has to ask for additions to get new elements, in the so-called “generic model”. In this paper we present some generic designs for asymmetric encryption with provable security in the random oracle model.