## Approximation techniques for utilitarian mechanism design (2005)

Venue: | IN PROC. 36TH ACM SYMP. ON THEORY OF COMPUTING |

Citations: | 64 - 3 self |

### BibTeX

@INPROCEEDINGS{Briest05approximationtechniques,

author = {Patrick Briest and Piotr Krysta and Berthold Vöcking},

title = { Approximation techniques for utilitarian mechanism design},

booktitle = {IN PROC. 36TH ACM SYMP. ON THEORY OF COMPUTING},

year = {2005},

publisher = {}

}

### Years of Citing Articles

### OpenURL

### Abstract

This paper deals with the design of efficiently computable incentive compatible, or truthful, mechanisms for combinatorial optimization problems with multi-parameter agents. We focus on approximation algorithms for NP-hard mechanism design problems. These algorithms need to satisfy certain monotonicity properties to ensure truthfulness. Since most of the known approximation techniques do not fulfill these properties, we study alternative techniques. Our first contribution is a quite general method to transform a pseudopolynomial algorithm into a monotone FPTAS. This can be applied to various problems like, e.g., knapsack, constrained shortest path, or job scheduling with deadlines. For example, the monotone FPTAS for the knapsack problem gives a very efficient, truthful mechanism for single-minded multi-unit auctions. The best previous result for such auctions was a 2-approximation. In addition,