Abstract

We investigate the predictive success of the Baron-Ferejohn model of legislative bargaining in laboratory environments. In particular, we use a finite period bargaining game under weighted majority rule where a fixed payoff is divided between three players. In each period one of the players is chosen according to a known rule to make a proposed allocation of a fixed sum among the three players. The proposal is then voted on, and if rejected, another proposer is selected until a proposal is accepted or the final period is reached. We find that our subjects ’ behavior is not predicted well by the Baron-Ferejohn model. The model predicts hardly better than a coin flip which coalition partner is selected by the chosen proposer, and proposers allocate more money to other players than predicted. In a significant minority of coalitions the sum is allocated equally across all three players. A sizable number of proposals are rejected in the first proposal periods and subjects who vote to reject a proposal on average receive a higher payoff from the new proposal. An alternative explanation of coalition bargaining outcomes based

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