Abstract

Western Finance Association meetings, the Northern Finance Association meetings and the Pacific Northwest Finance Conference for helpful comments. We would also like to thank Xifeng Diao and Yang Wu for research assistance. Giammarino, Hollifield and Li thank the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Seasoned equity offerings involve two significant events: registration followed by the decision to complete the issue or withdraw the registration. We present an empirical analysis of the interaction between seasoned equity issues, insider trading and the incorporation of information in prices around these two events. We find that the manager moves prices through corporate decisions but not personal ones. Specifically, the market reacts to the registration and the registration triggers information acquisition by the market, which is shown to influence the manager’s final decision. Seasoned equity offerings are characterized by two events: registration of the securities followed by the decision to complete the issue or withdraw the registration. Existing empirical research has uncovered a number of puzzles about the event. A first puzzle is that firms tend to issue

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