ERC -- A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity and Competition (1999)
by
Gary E Bolton
,
Axel Ockenfels
| Venue: | FORTHCOMING AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW |
| Citations: | 166 - 11 self |
BibTeX
@MISC{Bolton99erc--,
author = {Gary E Bolton and Axel Ockenfels},
title = {ERC -- A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity and Competition},
year = {1999}
}
Years of Citing Articles
OpenURL
Abstract
We demonstrate that a simple model, constructed on the premise that people are motivated by both their pecuniary payoff and their relative payoff standing, explains behavior in a wide variety of laboratory games. Included are games where equity is thought to be a factor, such as ultimatum, two-period alternating offer, and dictator games; games where reciprocity is thought to play a role, such as the prisoner’s dilemma and the gift exchange game; and games where competitive behavior is observed, such as Bertrand and Cournot markets, and the guessing game.







