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Institutions as the Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth (2005)

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by Daron Acemoglu , Simon Johnson , James Robinson
Venue:IN HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC GROWTH, ED. PHILIPPE AGHION AND STEPHEN DURLAUF
Citations:454 - 8 self
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BibTeX

@INPROCEEDINGS{Acemoglu05institutionsas,
    author = {Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson and James Robinson},
    title = {Institutions as the Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth},
    booktitle = {IN HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC GROWTH, ED. PHILIPPE AGHION AND STEPHEN DURLAUF},
    year = {2005},
    pages = {385--472},
    publisher = {Elsevier}
}

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Abstract

This paper develops the empirical and theoretical case that differences in economic institutions are the fundamental cause of differences in economic development. We first document the empirical importance of institutions by focusing on two “quasi-natural experiments” in history, the division of Korea into two parts with very different economic institutions and the colonization of much of the world by European powers starting in the fifteenth century. We then develop the basic outline of a framework for thinking about why economic institutions differ across countries. Economic institutions determine the incentives of and the constraints on economic actors, and shape economic outcomes. As such, they are social decisions, chosen for their consequences. Because different groups and individuals typically benefit from different economic institutions, there is generally aconflict over these social choices, ultimately resolved in favor of groups with greater political power. The distribution of political power in society is in turn determined by political institutions and the distribution of resources. Political institutions allocate de

Keyphrases

fundamental cause    economic institution    long-run growth    political institution    different economic institution    political power    different group    social decision    social choice    basic outline    economic development    european power    empirical importance    economic actor    quasi-natural experiment    fifteenth century    economic outcome    theoretical case   

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