Abstract

In our experimen subjects first an wer a person lity questionH ire. They then take part in a 3-person game. In the gameon player chooses between two possibilities. The first is an outside option which assign a positive amoun to that player, but leaves the two others empty-hanm d. The secon option con ists in the assign en of power over the distribution of a pie amon the three players toon of the other two players. Our main treatmen s differ with respect to the selection procedure by which distributive power is assign d: to a ranP ly determi n d or to akn i n ly selected part r. When maki n her decision the choosi n player could con ult the an wers to the person lity question ire of the other two players. Our results show that, as a first reaction kn i n ly selected players keep less for themselves than ranC mly selectedon s. We also fi n that, in both treatmen s, they allocate more to the players that have given them distributive power than to third players. In our data competition has motivation l an n on y allocative con equen es. *In stitut d'An lisi Econ mica (CSIC), Barcelon a. ** Max Plan ck In stitut, Jen a. *** Humboldt-Un iversitt zu Berlin . Fin an cial support by the European Un ion through the TMR researchn etwork ENDEAR (FMRX-CT980238) is gratefully ackn owledged. 1.

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