Voting blocs, party discipline and party formation. SSRN w.p (2010)
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BibTeX
@MISC{Eguia10votingblocs,,
author = {Jon X Eguia and I Thank Francis Bloch and Anna Bogomolnaia and Luis Corchon and Matias Iaryczower and Matt Jackson and Patrick Le and Ro Lizzeri and Andrea Mattozzi and Tom Palfrey},
title = {Voting blocs, party discipline and party formation. SSRN w.p},
year = {2010}
}
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Abstract
I study the strategic incentives to coordinate votes in an assembly. Coalitions form voting blocs, acting as single players and affecting the policy outcome. In an assembly with two exogenous parties I show how the incentives to accept party discipline depend on the types of the agents, the sizes of the parties, and the rules the blocs use to aggregate preferences. In a game of fully endogenous party formation, I find sufficient conditions for the existence of equilibria with one bloc, two blocs, and multiple blocs. JEL Classification: D71, D72.
