Heuristics and normative models of judgment under uncertainty (1996)
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| Venue: | International Journal of |
| Citations: | 8 - 6 self |
BibTeX
@ARTICLE{Wang96heuristicsand,
author = {Pei Wang},
title = {Heuristics and normative models of judgment under uncertainty},
journal = {International Journal of},
year = {1996}
}
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Abstract
Psychological evidence shows that probability theoryisnotaproper descriptive model of intuitive human judgment. Instead, some heuristics have been proposed as such a descriptive model. This paper argues that probability theory has limitations even as a normative model. A new normative model of judgment under uncertainty is designed under the assumption that the system's knowledge and resources are insu cient with respect to the questions that the system needs to answer. The proposed heuristics in human reasoning can also be observed inthis new model, and can be justi ed according to the assumption.
