MetaCart Sign in to MyCiteSeerX

Include Citations | Advanced Search | Help

Disambiguated Search | Include Citations | Advanced Search | Help

Co-Evolution of Auction Mechanisms and Trading Strategies: Towards a Novel Approach to Microeconomic Design (2002) [14 citations — 4 self]

by Steve Phelps ,  Simon Parsons ,  Peter Mcburney ,  Elizabeth Sklar
In GECCO-02 Workshop on Evolutionary Computation in Multi-Agent Systems
Add To MetaCart

Abstract:

Mechanism design is the economic theory of the design of effective resource allocation mechanisms, such as auctions. Traditionally, economists have approached design problems by studying the analytic properties of different mechanisms. An alternative is to view a mechanism as the outcome of some evolutionary process involving buyers, sellers and the auctioneer. As a first step in this alternative direction, we have applied genetic programming to the development of an auction pricing rule for double auctions in a wholesale electricity marketplace. For this purpose we adopted the multi-agent simulation model of Nicolaisen, Petrov and Tesfatsion.

Citations

1921 Genetic Programming I : On the Programming of Computers by Means of Natural Selection – Koza - 1992
361 Co-Evolving Parasites Improve Simulated Evolution as an Optimizing – Hillis - 1990
151 Strongly Typed Genetic Programming – Montana - 1995
138 Automated negotiation: Prospects, methods and challenges,’’ Group Decis – Jennings, Faratin, et al.
138 Competitive environments evolve better solutions for complex tasks – Angeline, Pollack - 1993
128 Distributed Rational Decision Making – Sandholm - 1999
118 Tracking the red queen: Measurements of adaptive progress in co-evolutionary simulations – Cliff, Miller - 1995
85 Co-evolution in the successful learning of Backgammon strategy – Pollack, Blair - 1998
58 Protean behavior in dynamic games: Arguments for the co-evolution of pursuit-evasion tactics – Miller, Cli - 1994
49 Challenges in coevolutionary learning: Arms-race dynamics, open-endedness, and mediocre stable states – Ficici, Pollack - 1998
48 The economist as engineer: game theory, experimentation, and computation as tools for design economics – Roth - 2002
38 Learning in Extensive Form Games: Experimental Data and Simple Dynamic Models in the Intermediate Term – Roth, Erev - 1995
36 Market power and efficiency in a computational electricity market with discriminatory double-auction pricing – Nicolaisen, Petrov, et al. - 2001
36 Symbiotic combination as an alternative to sexual recombination in genetic algorithms – Watson, Pollack - 2000
23 Mechanism theory – Jackson - 2003
21 M.: Adaptive task and resource allocation in multi-agent systems – Fatima, Wooldridge - 2001
20 How (not) to run auctions: the European 3G telecom auctions – Klemperer
11 Using co-evolutionary programming to simulate strategic behaviour in markets – Price - 1997
9 Co-evolution, determinism and robustness – Blair, Sklar, et al. - 1998
4 Market power and eciency in a computational electricity market with discriminatory double-auction pricing – Nicolaisen, Petrov, et al. - 2001
1 Evolutionary computation in MAS design – Sierra, Sabater, et al. - 2002
View or Download | Add to My Collection | Correct Errors