Abstract

sroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. . 2. Thea mount of underprovision of the public good rises a the number of contributors increa2T in the tot a e#ort ca'z but the e#cient a ount of the public good a d the Na sh equilibriumaZZ nt will berela ively consta nta s the number of contributors increa ses. 3. E#cient provision in the best-e#ort technology generax6 involves only theaZC ts with the lowest cost of contributing m a inga ny contributions aaZ= Cornes [1993] builds on Hirshleifer'sa ai sis. In pa6 icula r he ea mines the impa ct of cha nges in income distribution on the equilibriumaZC ca ion. S a dler a d Ha6 ley [2001] providea comprehensive survey of the work on ax lia ces, sta rting with the semina

Citations

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