Authors (2007)
BibTeX
@MISC{Huck07authors,
author = {Steffen Huck and Gabriele K. Lünser and Jean-robert Tyran and Steffen Huck and Gabriele K. Lünser and Jean-robert Tyran},
title = {Authors},
year = {2007}
}
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Abstract
We study the effects of reputation and competition in a stylized market for experience goods. If interaction is anonymous, such markets perform poorly: sellers are not trustworthy, and buyers do not trust sellers. If sellers are identifiable and can, hence, build a reputation, efficiency quadruples but is still at only a third of the first best. Adding more information by granting buyers access to all sellers ’ complete history has, somewhat surprisingly, no effect. On the other hand, we find that competition, coupled with some minimal information, eliminates the trust problem almost completely.
