Abstract

The allocation of discrete, complementm'y resources is a fundamental probleln in econolnics and of direct interest to e-colnlnerce applications. Combinatorial auctions account for complementarities by optimizing over offers expressed in terms of bundles. Progressive versions of combinatorial auctions alleviate the burden on bidders of expressing offers for all bundles of interest by providing interiln feedback based on partial sets of bids. Feedback in terms of hypothetical prices is particularly useful, as it directs bidders to,yard those bundles potentially yielding the greatest surplus. For a general class of discrete resource allocation problelns vith free disposal, we establish by construction the existence of competitive equilibriuln prices on bundles that support the efficient allocation. We introduce AkBA, a falnily of progressive auctions that use these equilibriuln bundle prices. We exalnine a particular instance of the family, called A1BA, and present SOlne elnpirical data on its perforlnance.

Citations