The Sybil Attack (2002)
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BibTeX
@INPROCEEDINGS{Douceur02thesybil,
author = {John Douceur and Judith S. Donath},
title = {The Sybil Attack},
booktitle = {},
year = {2002},
pages = {251--260}
}
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Abstract
Large-scale peer-to-peer systems face security threats from faulty or hostile remote computing elements. To resist these threats, many such systems employ redundancy. However, if a single faulty entity can present multiple identities, it can control a substantial fraction of the system, thereby undermining this redundancy. One approach to preventing these "Sybil attacks" is to have a trusted agency certify identities. This paper shows that, without a logically centralized authority, Sybil attacks are always possible except under extreme and unrealistic assumptions of resource parity and coordination among entities.
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