The Sybil Attack

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The Sybil Attack (2002)

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by John Douceur , Judith S. Donath

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@INPROCEEDINGS{Douceur02thesybil,
    author = {John Douceur and Judith S. Donath},
    title = {The Sybil Attack},
    booktitle = {},
    year = {2002},
    pages = {251--260}
}

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Abstract

Large-scale peer-to-peer systems face security threats from faulty or hostile remote computing elements. To resist these threats, many such systems employ redundancy. However, if a single faulty entity can present multiple identities, it can control a substantial fraction of the system, thereby undermining this redundancy. One approach to preventing these "Sybil attacks" is to have a trusted agency certify identities. This paper shows that, without a logically centralized authority, Sybil attacks are always possible except under extreme and unrealistic assumptions of resource parity and coordination among entities.

Keyphrases

sybil attack large-scale peer-to-peer system substantial fraction hostile remote unrealistic assumption resource parity many system multiple identity single faulty entity trusted agency security threat