Model Checking an Entire Linux Distribution for Security Violations (2005)
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| Venue: | In Proceedings of the 21st Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC |
| Citations: | 21 - 3 self |
BibTeX
@INPROCEEDINGS{Schwarz05modelchecking,
author = {Benjamin Schwarz and Hao Chen and David Wagner and Geoff Morrison and Jacob West and Jeremy Lin},
title = {Model Checking an Entire Linux Distribution for Security Violations},
booktitle = {In Proceedings of the 21st Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC},
year = {2005}
}
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Abstract
Software model checking has become a popular tool for verifying programs ’ behavior. Recent results suggest that it is viable for finding and eradicating security bugs quickly. However, even state-of-the-art model checkers are limited in use when they report an overwhelming number of false positives, or when their lengthy running time dwarfs other software development processes. In this paper we report our experiences with software model checking for security properties on an extremely large scale—an entire Linux distribution consisting of 839 packages and 60 million lines of code. To date, we have discovered 108 exploitable bugs. Our results indicate that model checking can be both a feasible and integral part of the software development process. 1
