## � � � � � � United We Vote ∗ (2005)

Citations: | 1 - 0 self |

### BibTeX

@MISC{Eguia05��,

author = {Jon X. Eguia},

title = {� � � � � � United We Vote ∗},

year = {2005}

}

### OpenURL

### Abstract

This paper studies the advantages that a coalition of agents in a larger electorate can obtain by forming a voting bloc to pool their votes and cast them all in one direction. We show under which conditions an agent will benefit from the formation of the voting bloc, whether being part of it or stepping out is most advantageous for an individual agent and what are the different optimal internal voting rules to aggregate preferences within the coalition.

### Citations

86 |
The Calculus of Consent
- Buchanan, Tullock
- 1965
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...ally have different goals, what is the coalition going to stand for? The coalition requires to adopt an internal decision-making rule to aggregate the preferences of its members. Buchanan and Tullock =-=[3]-=- praise the virtues of unanimity, both as Constitutional rule (all members have to agree to join a Union) and as internal voting rule for the coalition or Union (the Union only acts collectively if al... |

25 |
A noncooperative theory of legislative coalitions
- Baron
- 1989
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...oting blocs that are formed. Some models studying the incentives to party formation are grounded on a distributive politics setting, where parties help agents to "get a share of the pie", as in Baron =-=[2]-=-. Jackson and Moselle [9] attempt to model coalition and party formation with both distributive and ideological dimensions. Our approach would try to explain party formation solely on the grounds of e... |

23 |
On the distribution of the number of successes in independent trials
- Darroch
- 1964
(Show Context)
Citation Context ... −1 independent Bernoulli trials, each trial taking the type of a member of C\{i, j} as probability of success. The sum of independent Bernoulli trials is a unimodal distribution, as shown by Darroch =-=[7]-=-. Therefore, gij( N 2 gij( N 2 − k − 1). For any i, j, gi( N 2 pjgij( N 2 + k) − gi( N 2 + k − 1) + (1 − pj)gij( N 2 + k − 1) >gij( N 2 − k) is equal to: + k) − pjgij( N 2 > (2pj − 1)gij( N 2 + k − 1)... |

11 |
Decision rules and individual values in constitutional choice
- Rae
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...after the final vote) than simple majority. The optimality of simple majority rule as internal aggregation rule for a set of agents (in our case coalition C) for any common type p is mentioned in Rae =-=[12]-=- and proved in Taylor [13]. We check that we can extend this result to fit our model with an individual type for each agent: Let Sm denote simple majority as internal voting rule for coalition C, andl... |

10 |
The Endogenous Formation of Economic Coalitions
- Carraro, ed
- 2003
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...ical competition between agents who know each other and can communicate to form a coalition. Several non-cooperative theories of coalition formation with economic applications are surveyed in Carraro =-=[4]-=-. Here we study coalition formation in a political setting in which agents wish to win an electoral vote: Agents coalesce because doing so increases the probability of getting the outcome they want in... |

7 |
Self-Enforcing Voting in
- Maggi, Morelli
- 2006
(Show Context)
Citation Context ... let unanimity be the Constitutional rule used to choose among rules, and we show that in most cases agents will prefer to choose some other rule as internal decision-making rule. Maggi and Morelli’s =-=[11]-=- study self-enforcing rules to determine whether collective action will be taken or not by a group of agents that requires each and every agent to participate in the collective effort. Our model can a... |

5 |
In or Out? Centralization by Majority Vote”, European Economic Review
- Cremer, Palfray
- 1996
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...will never be the case that extremists from both tails reject the formation of a voting bloc. We find it interesting to compare this result with a different model of federalism, by Crémer and Palfrey =-=[5]-=- and [6]. Crémer and Palfrey argue that moderate voters, with preferences closer to the median of the Union, will advocate federalism and unified policies. Complementing their work, our paper provides... |

5 | Forming voting blocs and coalitions as prisoner’s dilemma: A possible theoretical explanation for political instability. Contributions to Economic Analysis and Policy
- Gelman
(Show Context)
Citation Context ... and Morelli’s setting no other internal rule but simple majority or unanimity is ever optimal. Adifferent approach to coalition formation comes from the voting power literature in the work of Gelman =-=[8]-=-, who concentrates on the probability of casting a decisive vote in an election and the effect of coalitions over such probability. We focus on the probability of getting the desired outcome out of th... |

2 | Choosing How to Choose: Self-Stable Majority Rules
- Jackson, M
- 2000
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...nternal voting rule for the coalition or Union (the Union only acts collectively if all members agree on some course of action; otherwise each member can pursue its own policies). Barberá and Jackson =-=[1]-=- let agents choose among different rules, and they define "self-stable" voting rules as those that will not be beaten by any other rule if the given voting rule is used to choose among rules. We let u... |

1 |
Political Confederation
- -Crémer, Palfrey
- 1999
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...er be the case that extremists from both tails reject the formation of a voting bloc. We find it interesting to compare this result with a different model of federalism, by Crémer and Palfrey [5] and =-=[6]-=-. Crémer and Palfrey argue that moderate voters, with preferences closer to the median of the Union, will advocate federalism and unified policies. Complementing their work, our paper provides a ratio... |

1 |
Assessing Success and Decisiveness in Voting Situations." Forthcoming in Social Choice and Welfare
- -Laruelle, Valenciano
- 2004
(Show Context)
Citation Context ... the desired outcome. For a rigorous study of the relation and differences between voting power and probability of success or satisfaction (the approach we take), we recommend Laruelle and Valenciano =-=[10]-=-. Let us visualize when will a member prefer to opt-out and free-ride on her coalition partners with the aid of Figure 5, where again N =24,M= 176, the 24 members other than l in coalition C share a c... |

1 |
Critique and Comment: Proof of a Theorem on Majority Rule
- -Taylor
- 1969
(Show Context)
Citation Context ... simple majority. The optimality of simple majority rule as internal aggregation rule for a set of agents (in our case coalition C) for any common type p is mentioned in Rae [12] and proved in Taylor =-=[13]-=-. We check that we can extend this result to fit our model with an individual type for each agent: Let Sm denote simple majority as internal voting rule for coalition C, andlet vr denote any other int... |