2001): “Why Likelihood (1980)
| Venue: | The Nature of Scientific Evidence |
| Citations: | 7 - 5 self |
BibTeX
@INPROCEEDINGS{Forster802001):“why,
author = {Malcolm Forster and Elliott Sober},
title = {2001): “Why Likelihood},
booktitle = {The Nature of Scientific Evidence},
year = {1980},
publisher = {University of Chicago Press}
}
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Abstract
ABSTRACT: The Likelihood Principle has been defended on Bayesian grounds, on the grounds that it coincides with and systematizes intuitive judgments about example problems, and by appeal to the fact that it generalizes what is true when hypotheses have deductive consequences about observations. Here we divide the Principle into two parts-- one qualitative, the other quantitative-- and evaluate each in the light of the Akaike information criterion. Both turn out to be correct in a special case (when the competing hypotheses have the same number of adjustable parameters), but not otherwise.
