## eBay in the sky: Strategy-proof wireless spectrum auctions (2008)

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Venue: | In Proc. of MobiCom |

Citations: | 33 - 5 self |

### BibTeX

@INPROCEEDINGS{Zhou08ebayin,

author = {Xia Zhou and Sorabh G and Subhash Suri and Haitao Zheng},

title = {eBay in the sky: Strategy-proof wireless spectrum auctions},

booktitle = {In Proc. of MobiCom},

year = {2008}

}

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### Abstract

Market-driven dynamic spectrum auctions can drastically improve the spectrum availability for wireless networks struggling to obtain additional spectrum. However, they face significant challenges due to the fear of market manipulation. A truthful or strategy-proof spectrum auction eliminates the fear by enforcing players to bid their true valuations of the spectrum. Hence bidders can avoid the expensive overhead of strategizing over others and the auctioneer can maximize its revenue by assigning spectrum to bidders who value it the most. Conventional truthful designs, however, either fail or become computationally intractable when applied to spectrum auctions. In this paper, we propose VERITAS, a truthful and computationally-efficient spectrum auction to support an eBay-like dynamic spectrum market. VERITAS makes an important contribution of maintaining truthfulness while maximizing spectrum utilization. We show analytically that VERITAS is truthful, efficient, and has a polynomial complexity of O(n 3 k) when n bidders compete for k spectrum bands. Simulation results show that VERITAS outperforms the extensions of conventional truthful designs by up to 200 % in spectrum utilization. Finally, VERITAS supports diverse bidding formats and enables the auctioneer to reconfigure allocations for multiple market objectives.

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Citation Context ...ectrum to the bidders who value it the most. For the same reason, many classical auction systems are made truthful, including the sealed-bid secondary-price [15], k-position [10, 11] and VCG auctions =-=[2, 5]-=-. While prior works have enforced truthfulness in conventional auctions, we show that existing truthful designs either fail or become computationally prohibitive when applied to spectrum auctions. The... |

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Citation Context ... interdependencies among bidders make secondary-price and kposition auctions no longer truthful. Furthermore, these constraints make the problem of finding the optimal spectrum allocation NP-complete =-=[8]-=-, and hence a real-time spectrum auction with many bidders must resort to greedy allocations that are computationally efficient. Unfortunately, it has been shown that the VCG auction loses its truthfu... |

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Citation Context ...optimizations for other types of network topologies are much harder, and we seek to address them in a future study. 8. RELATED WORK Auctions have been used by FCC to allocate scarce spectrum resource =-=[3]-=-. Huge body of works follow on the designs of wireless spectrum auctions in different scenarios. These include transmit power auctions [6] where bidders use the same spectrum band but bid transmit pow... |

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Citation Context ...ts revenue by assigning spectrum to the bidders who value it the most. For the same reason, many classical auction systems are made truthful, including the sealed-bid secondary-price [15], k-position =-=[10, 11]-=- and VCG auctions [2, 5]. While prior works have enforced truthfulness in conventional auctions, we show that existing truthful designs either fail or become computationally prohibitive when applied t... |

95 | Truthful approximation mechanisms for restricted combinatorial auctions: extended abstract
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(Show Context)
Citation Context ...ts revenue by assigning spectrum to the bidders who value it the most. For the same reason, many classical auction systems are made truthful, including the sealed-bid secondary-price [15], k-position =-=[10, 11]-=- and VCG auctions [2, 5]. While prior works have enforced truthfulness in conventional auctions, we show that existing truthful designs either fail or become computationally prohibitive when applied t... |

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Citation Context ...rum auctions in different scenarios. These include transmit power auctions [6] where bidders use the same spectrum band but bid transmit power to minimize the interference, and spectrum band auctions =-=[1, 4, 7, 13]-=- where bidders obtain different spectrum channels to minimize the interference. However, none of these addresses the problem of truthfulness/strategy-proofness. Truthfulness/strategy-proofness is a cr... |

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Citation Context ...m auction with many bidders must resort to greedy allocations that are computationally efficient. Unfortunately, it has been shown that the VCG auction loses its truthfulness under greedy allocations =-=[9]-=-. In this paper, we propose VERITAS, a truthful dynamic spectrum auction framework that only requires polynomial complexity. VERITAS is a sealed-bid truthful auction: bidders submit their bids private... |

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(Show Context)
Citation Context ...ioneer increase its revenue by assigning spectrum to the bidders who value it the most. For the same reason, many classical auction systems are made truthful, including the sealed-bid secondary-price =-=[15]-=-, k-position [10, 11] and VCG auctions [2, 5]. While prior works have enforced truthfulness in conventional auctions, we show that existing truthful designs either fail or become computationally prohi... |

43 |
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Citation Context ...rum auctions in different scenarios. These include transmit power auctions [6] where bidders use the same spectrum band but bid transmit power to minimize the interference, and spectrum band auctions =-=[1, 4, 7, 13]-=- where bidders obtain different spectrum channels to minimize the interference. However, none of these addresses the problem of truthfulness/strategy-proofness. Truthfulness/strategy-proofness is a cr... |

38 |
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(Show Context)
Citation Context ...rum auctions in different scenarios. These include transmit power auctions [6] where bidders use the same spectrum band but bid transmit power to minimize the interference, and spectrum band auctions =-=[1, 4, 7, 13]-=- where bidders obtain different spectrum channels to minimize the interference. However, none of these addresses the problem of truthfulness/strategy-proofness. Truthfulness/strategy-proofness is a cr... |

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Citation Context ...as been shown that to maximize the sum of winning bids, also known as the social welfare [11], the best-known greedy allocation algorithm asbi signs channel following the descending order of |N(i)+1| =-=[14]-=-. 4.4 VERITAS Computational Complexity We now analyze the running time of VERITAS for a given conflict graph G = (V, E) with n bidders and k channels. First, VERITAS-Alloc takes O(n log n) time to sor... |

25 | Truthful multicast routing in selfish wireless networks
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(Show Context)
Citation Context ...ategy-proofness. Truthfulness/strategy-proofness is a crucial property from the economic perspective. It has been applied to other scenarios beyond traditional auctions such as the multi-cast routing =-=[16]-=-. The notion of truthful bidding in sealed-bid auctions was first brought out by Vickery in his seminal paper [15], which introduced the secondary pricing for oneitem auctions. This work was then gene... |

15 |
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(Show Context)
Citation Context ...orks on truthful mechanism design using greedy algorithms or linear programming for specific classes of bidders in specific problem domains [10] [11]. We point the interested readers to the survey in =-=[12]-=- for more details. As discussed in Section 3, these existing solutions, when applied to spectrum auctions, either lose the truthfulness, require exponential complexity, or result in significant degrad... |

14 | Auction mechanisms for distributed spectrum sharing
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(Show Context)
Citation Context ...ns have been used by FCC to allocate scarce spectrum resource [3]. Huge body of works follow on the designs of wireless spectrum auctions in different scenarios. These include transmit power auctions =-=[6]-=- where bidders use the same spectrum band but bid transmit power to minimize the interference, and spectrum band auctions [1, 4, 7, 13] where bidders obtain different spectrum channels to minimize the... |

12 |
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(Show Context)
Citation Context |

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(Show Context)
Citation Context ...ectrum to the bidders who value it the most. For the same reason, many classical auction systems are made truthful, including the sealed-bid secondary-price [15], k-position [10, 11] and VCG auctions =-=[2, 5]-=-. While prior works have enforced truthfulness in conventional auctions, we show that existing truthful designs either fail or become computationally prohibitive when applied to spectrum auctions. The... |