Self-financed wagering mechanisms for forecasting
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| Venue: | EC |
| Citations: | 11 - 5 self |
BibTeX
@ARTICLE{Lambert_self-financedwagering,
author = {Nicolas Lambert and John Langford and Jennifer Wortman and Yiling Chen and Daniel Reeves and Yoav Shoham and David M. Pennock},
title = {Self-financed wagering mechanisms for forecasting},
journal = {EC},
year = {},
pages = {2008}
}
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Abstract
We examine a class of wagering mechanisms designed to elicit truthful predictions from a group of people without requiring any outside subsidy. We propose a number of desirable properties for wagering mechanisms, identifying one mechanism—weighted-score wagering—that satisfies all of the properties. Moreover, we show that a single-parameter generalization of weighted-score wagering is the only mechanism that satisfies these properties. We explore some variants of the core mechanism based on practical considerations. Categories and Subject Descriptors
