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A Scheduling Approach to Coalitional Manipulation

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by Lirong Xia , Vincent Conitzer , Ariel D. Procaccia
Citations:21 - 9 self
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@MISC{Xia_ascheduling,
    author = {Lirong Xia and Vincent Conitzer and Ariel D. Procaccia},
    title = {A Scheduling Approach to Coalitional Manipulation},
    year = {}
}

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Abstract

The coalitional manipulation problem is one of the central problems in computational social choice. In this paper we focus on solving the problem under the important family of positional scoring rules, in an approximate sense that was advocated by Zuckerman et al. [SODA 2008]. Our main result is a polynomial-time algorithm with (roughly speaking) the following theoretical guarantee: given a manipulable instance with m alternatives the algorithm finds a successful manipulation with at most m − 2 additional manipulators. Our technique is based on a reduction to the scheduling problem known as Q|pmtn|Cmax, along with a novel rounding procedure. We demonstrate that our analysis is tight by establishing a new type of integrality gap. We also resolve a known open question in computational social choice by showing that the coalitional manipulation problem remains (strongly) NP-complete for positional scoring rules even when votes are unweighted. Finally, we discuss the implications of our results with respect to the question: “Is there a prominent voting rule that is usually hard to manipulate?”

Citations

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86 When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate - Conitzer, Sandholm, et al.
72 Junta distributions and the average-case complexity of manipulating elections - Procaccia, Rosenschein
50 Introduction to mechanism design (for computer scientists - Nisan - 2007
41 Generalized Scoring Rules and the frequency of coalitional manipulability - Xia, Conitzer - 2008
40 Hybrid voting protocols and hardness of manipulation - Elkind, Lipmaa
39 Elections can be manipulated often - Friedgut, Kalai, et al. - 2008
38 Dichotomy for voting systems - Hemaspaandra, Hemaspaandra
30 A sufficient condition for voting rules to be frequently manipulable - Xia, Conitzer - 2008
27 Copeland voting: Ties matter - Faliszewski, Hemaspaandra - 2008
26 Preemptive scheduling of uniform processor systems - Gonzalez, Sahni - 1978
26 Complexity of unweighted coalitional manipulation under some common voting rules - XIA, ZUCKERMAN, et al.
2 L.Pinedo. Scheduling: Theory, Algorithms, and Systems - Michael - 2008
1 20] Lirong - Xia, Procaccia, et al. - 2008
1 Conitzer and Tuomas Sandholm. Universal voting protocol tweaks to make manipulation hard - Vincent - 2003
1 Conitzer and Tuomas Sandholm. Nonexistence of voting rules that are usually hard to manipulate - Vincent - 2006
1 Dichotomy for voting systems. Journal of Computer and System Sciences, 73(1):73–83, 2007. [15] Noam Nisan. Introduction to mechanism design (for computer scientists - Nisan, Roughgarden, et al.
1 editors, Algorithmic Game Theory, chapter 9 - Tardos, Vazirani - 2007
1 Finite local consistency generalized scoring rules - Xia, Conitzer - 2009
1 Bartholdi,III andJames Orlin.Singletransferable vote resistsstrategic voting - John - 1991
1 The computational difficultyof manipulating anelection - Bartholdi, CraigTovey, et al. - 1989
1 Scheduling Algorithms.Springer - PeterBrucker - 2007
1 Conitzer andTuomas Sandholm. Universal voting protocol tweaks tomake manipulation hard - Vincent - 2003
1 Conitzer andTuomas Sandholm. Nonexistence of votingrules that are usuallyhard tomanipulate. InProc.of AAAI-06,pages 627–634 - Vincent - 2006
1 Conitzer,Tuomas Sandholm, andJérôme Lang. Whenare elections withfew candidates hardtomanipulate - Vincent
1 Copeland voting: tiesmatter.InProc. of AAMAS-08,pages 983–990 - PiotrFaliszewski, Schnoor - 2008
1 GilKalai,and Noam Nisan. Elections canbe manipulated often - EhudFriedgut - 2008
1 Manipulation of votingschemes: a general result.Econometrica - AllanGibbard - 1973
1 Algorithmic Game Theory, chapter 9.Cambridge UniversityPress,2007 - Vazirani
1 Conitzer, andJeffrey S.Rosenschein. Complexityof unweighted coalitional manipulation under some common votingrules - LirongXia, Procaccia
1 Copeland voting: tiesmatter.In - PiotrFaliszewski, Schnoor - 2008
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