Multi-unit auctions with budget limits (2008)
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by
Shahar Dobzinski
,
Noam Nisan
,
Ron Lavi
| Venue: | In Proc. of the 49th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS |
| Citations: | 20 - 4 self |
BibTeX
@INPROCEEDINGS{Dobzinski08multi-unitauctions,
author = {Shahar Dobzinski and Noam Nisan and Ron Lavi},
title = {Multi-unit auctions with budget limits},
booktitle = {In Proc. of the 49th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS},
year = {2008}
}
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Abstract
We study multi-unit auctions where the bidders have a budget constraint, a situation very common in practice that has received very little attention in the auction theory literature. Our main result is an impossibility: there are no incentive-compatible auctions that always produce a Pareto-optimal allocation. We also obtain some surprising positive results for certain special cases. 1
