Competitive Generalized Auctions (2002)
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by
Amos Fiat
,
Andrew V. Goldberg
,
Jason D. Hartline
,
Anna R. Karlin
| Citations: | 81 - 18 self |
BibTeX
@MISC{Fiat02competitivegeneralized,
author = {Amos Fiat and Andrew V. Goldberg and Jason D. Hartline and Anna R. Karlin},
title = {Competitive Generalized Auctions},
year = {2002}
}
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Abstract
We describe mechanisms for auctions that are simultaneously truthful (alternately known as strategy-proof or incentive-compatible) and guarantee high "net" profit. We make use of appropriate variants of competitive analysis of algorithms in designing and analyzing our mechanisms. Thus, we do not require any probabilistic assumptions on bids. We present
