Abstract

Foundational certified code systems seek to prove untrusted programs to be safe relative to safety policies given in terms of actual machine architectures, thereby improving the systems ' flexibility and extensibility. Using the Twelf metalogical framework, we have constructed a safety policy for the IA-32 architecture with a trusted runtime library. The safety policy is based on a formalized operational semantics. We have also developed a complete, foundational proof that a fully expressive typed assembly language satisfies that safety policy.

Citations

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