Refinement types for secure implementations (2008)
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| Venue: | In 21st IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF’08 |
| Citations: | 43 - 14 self |
BibTeX
@INPROCEEDINGS{Bengtson08refinementtypes,
author = {Jesper Bengtson and Karthikeyan Bhargavan and Cédric Fournet and Sergio Maffeis and Andrew D. Gordon},
title = {Refinement types for secure implementations},
booktitle = {In 21st IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF’08},
year = {2008},
pages = {17--32},
publisher = {IEEE}
}
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Abstract
We present the design and implementation of a typechecker for verifying security properties of the source code of cryptographic protocols and access control mechanisms. The underlying type theory is a λ-calculus equipped with refinement types for expressing pre- and post-conditions within first-order logic. We derive formal cryptographic primitives and represent active adversaries within the type theory. Well-typed programs enjoy assertion-based security properties, with respect to a realistic threat model including key compromise. The implementation amounts to an enhanced typechecker for the general purpose functional language F#; typechecking generates verification conditions that are passed to an SMT solver. We describe a series of checked examples. This is the first tool to verify authentication properties of cryptographic protocols by typechecking their source code. 1
