## Uniqueness of Stationary Equilibrium Payoffs . . . (2006)

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Citations: | 24 - 3 self |

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@MISC{Eraslan06uniquenessof,

author = {Hülya Eraslan and Andrew McLennan},

title = {Uniqueness of Stationary Equilibrium Payoffs . . .},

year = {2006}

}

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### Citations

2297 |
Game Theory
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(Show Context)
Citation Context ...uple of strategies, one for each player. A strategy pro le is subgame perfect if and only if no player can bene t by deviating from his strategy at a single date (see for example Fudenberg and Tirole =-=[4]-=-). A strategy pro le is stationary if it does not depend on the current date and past history. A strategy pro le is stationary subgame perfect (SSP) if it is stationary and subgame perfect. An SSP out... |

1305 | Microeconomic Theory - Mas-Colell, Whinston, et al. - 1982 |

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Bargaining in Legislatures
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Citation Context ... discount factor. Key Words: Multilateral bargaining, majority rule Journal of Economic Literature Classi cation numbers: C72,C78,D70 1. INTRODUCTION In their seminal contribution, Baron and Ferejohn =-=[2]-=- present a simple sequential model of multilateral bargaining with majority rule. The game they consider is a standard \divide the dollar" game where n risk neutral players are randomly selected or \r... |

55 |
A Stochastic Model of Sequential Bargaining with Complete Information.” Econometrica
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Citation Context ... (see, for example, Sutton [6]). However, it has also been recognized that stationarity is typically able to select a unique equilibrium (see, for example, Baron and Ferejohn [2] and Merlo and Wilson =-=[5]-=-). Thus, we restrict our attention to SSP equilibria.4 HULYA ERASLAN 3. CHARACTERIZATION OF SSP EQUILIBRIA In this section we characterize the SSP payo s and strategies. 2 To simplify notation we de ... |

48 |
Non-Cooperative Bargaining Theory: An Introduction
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Citation Context ...egy pro le. It is well known that in multilateral bargaining games like the one considered here there is multiplicity of subgame perfect equilibria even under unanimity rule (see, for example, Sutton =-=[6]-=-). However, it has also been recognized that stationarity is typically able to select a unique equilibrium (see, for example, Baron and Ferejohn [2] and Merlo and Wilson [5]). Thus, we restrict our at... |

47 | 2002) “Coalition and Party Formation in a Legislative Voting Game - Jackson, Moselle |

45 | A bargaining model of collective choice
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Citation Context ...across players. We show that, for general recognition probabilities, the vector of stationary subgame perfect equilibrium payo s is unique. The model we consider is a special case of Banks and Duggan =-=[1]-=- who establish the existence of stationary subgame perfect equlibria when the set of alternatives is multidimensional and players are risk averse. Note, however, that the uniqueness result obtained he... |

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The simplest equilibrium of a majority-rule division game
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Citation Context ... cake share only. We also assume that players discount the future and we let i < 1 denote player i's discount factor. 1 An interesting feature of this equilibrium is that, as shown by Baron and Kalai =-=[3]-=-, it is the unique simplest equilibrium of the corresponding automaton game.UNIQUENESS OF EQUILIBRIUM PAYOFFS 3 The game is played as follows. At date 0, player i is selected as the proposer with pro... |

12 | A structural model of government formation - Diermeier, Merlo |

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