Exposing and eliminating vulnerabilities to denial of service attacks in secure gossip-based multicast

Exposing and eliminating vulnerabilities to denial of service attacks in secure gossip-based multicast (2004)

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by Gal Badishi , Idit Keidar , Amir Sasson

Venue:	In Proc. DSN-2004
Citations:	22 - 4 self

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@INPROCEEDINGS{Badishi04exposingand,
    author = {Gal Badishi and Idit Keidar and Amir Sasson},
    title = {Exposing and eliminating vulnerabilities to denial of service attacks in secure gossip-based multicast},
    booktitle = {In Proc. DSN-2004},
    year = {2004},
    pages = {223},
    publisher = {IEEE Computer Society}
}

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Abstract

We propose a framework and methodology for quantifying the effect of denial of service (DoS) attacks on a distributed system. We present a systematic study of the resistance of gossip-based multicast protocols to DoS attacks. We show that even distributed and randomized gossip-based protocols, which eliminate single points of failure, do not necessarily eliminate vulnerabilities to DoS attacks. We propose Drum – a simple gossip-based multicast protocol that eliminates such vulnerabilities. Drum was implemented in Java and tested on a large cluster. We show, using closed-form mathematical analysis, simulations, and empirical tests, that Drum survives severe DoS attacks. 1

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1	Pull Average Latency (msecs) (a) α = 10%, x = 32F - Push