## SIMPLE DETERMINISTIC FREE WILL (2002)

### BibTeX

@MISC{Mccarthy02simpledeterministic,

author = {John Mccarthy},

title = {SIMPLE DETERMINISTIC FREE WILL},

year = {2002}

}

### OpenURL

### Abstract

A common feature of free will is that a person has choices among alternative actions and chooses the action with the apparently most preferred consequences. In a determinist theory, the mechanism that makes the choice among the alternatives is determinist. The sensation of free will comes from the fact that the mechanism that generates the choices uses a non-determinist theory as a computational device and that the stage in which the choices have been identified is introspectable. The present formalism is based on work in artificial intelligence (AI). We present a theory of simple deterministic free will (SDFW) in a deterministic world. The theory splits the mechanism that determines action into two parts. The first part computes possible actions and their consequences. Then the second part decides which action is most preferable and does it.

### Citations

1483 | Some philosophical problems from the standpoint of artificial intelligence
- McCarthy, Hayes
- 1969
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...ulas for SDFW Artificial intelligence requires expressing this phenomenon formally, and we’ll do it here in the mathematical logical language of situation calculus. Situation calculus is described in =-=[MH69]-=-, [Sha97], [Rei01], and in the extended form used here, in [McC02]. Richmond Thomason in [Tho03] compares situation calculus to theories of action in the philosophical literature. As usually presented... |

190 |
Made-up minds: a constructivist approach to artificial intelligence
- Drescher
- 1991
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...re more likely to survive than those without it. This seems to be why human free will evolved. When and how it evolved, as with other questions about evolution, won’t be easy to answer. Gary Drescher =-=[Dre91]-=- contrasts situation-action laws with what he calls the prediction-value paradigm. His prediction-value paradigm corresponds approximately to the deterministic free will discussed in this article. I t... |

179 |
Solving the Frame Problem: A Mathematical Investigation of the Common Sense Law of Inertia
- Shanahan
- 1997
(Show Context)
Citation Context ... SDFW Artificial intelligence requires expressing this phenomenon formally, and we’ll do it here in the mathematical logical language of situation calculus. Situation calculus is described in [MH69], =-=[Sha97]-=-, [Rei01], and in the extended form used here, in [McC02]. Richmond Thomason in [Tho03] compares situation calculus to theories of action in the philosophical literature. As usually presented, situati... |

92 |
Intentional Systems
- Dennett
- 1971
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...s first—in contrast to approaches that demand that all complications be understood before anything can be said. In this it resembles the approaches to belief and other intentional states discussed in =-=[Den71]-=-, [Den78], and [McC79]. Starting with simple systems is the practice in AI, because only what is understood can be implemented in computer programs. It seems to me that formulas (1) and (2) expressing... |

85 |
Knowledge in Action
- Reiter
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...ificial intelligence requires expressing this phenomenon formally, and we’ll do it here in the mathematical logical language of situation calculus. Situation calculus is described in [MH69], [Sha97], =-=[Rei01]-=-, and in the extended form used here, in [McC02]. Richmond Thomason in [Tho03] compares situation calculus to theories of action in the philosophical literature. As usually presented, situation calcul... |

81 | Making robots conscious of their mental states
- McCarthy
- 1995
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...n be trained to do it. Chess programs do compare the consequences of various moves, and so have free will in the sense of this article. Present programs are not conscious of their free will, however. =-=[McC96]-=- discusses what consciousness computer programs need. People and chess programs carry thinking about choice beyond the first level. Thus “If I make this move, my opponent (or nature regarded as an opp... |

71 |
Brainstorms: philosophical essays on mind and psychology
- Dennett
- 1978
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...n contrast to approaches that demand that all complications be understood before anything can be said. In this it resembles the approaches to belief and other intentional states discussed in [Den71], =-=[Den78]-=-, and [McC79]. Starting with simple systems is the practice in AI, because only what is understood can be implemented in computer programs. It seems to me that formulas (1) and (2) expressing the use ... |

56 | Formalizing Common Sense: Papers by - McCarthy - 1990 |

6 | Logic and artificial intelligence
- Thomason
- 2003
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...o it here in the mathematical logical language of situation calculus. Situation calculus is described in [MH69], [Sha97], [Rei01], and in the extended form used here, in [McC02]. Richmond Thomason in =-=[Tho03]-=- compares situation calculus to theories of action in the philosophical literature. As usually presented, situation calculus is a non-deterministic theory. The equation s ′ = Result(e,s) asserts that ... |

2 |
Ascribing mental qualities to machines 4
- McCarthy
- 1979
(Show Context)
Citation Context ... approaches that demand that all complications be understood before anything can be said. In this it resembles the approaches to belief and other intentional states discussed in [Den71], [Den78], and =-=[McC79]-=-. Starting with simple systems is the practice in AI, because only what is understood can be implemented in computer programs. It seems to me that formulas (1) and (2) expressing the use of the branch... |

2 |
Approximate objects and approximate theories 6
- McCarthy
- 2000
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...lt(a1,s) and Result(a2,s), as they are computed by the agent, are not full states of the world but elements of some theoretical space of approximate situations the agent uses in making its decisions. =-=[McC00]-=- has a discussion of approximate entities. Part of the problem of building humanlevel AI lies in inventing what kind of entity Result(a,s) shall be taken to be. 4. Whether a human or an animal uses si... |

1 |
and real: Paradoxes from physics to ethics
- Good
- 2006
(Show Context)
Citation Context ... calls the prediction-value paradigm. His prediction-value paradigm corresponds approximately to the deterministic free will discussed in this article. I thank Drescher for showing me his forthcoming =-=[Dre06]-=-. His notion of choice system corresponds pretty well to SDFW, although it is imbedded in a more elaborate context. This article benefited from discussions with Johan van Benthem, Daniel Dennett, Gary... |

1 |
A Basis for a Mathematical Theory of Computation 3
- McCarthy
- 1963
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...,A1,S0)). (4) 1 (2) uses a conditional expression. if p then a else b has the value a if the proposition p is true and otherwise has the value b. The theory of conditional expressions is discussed in =-=[McC63]-=-. Conditional expressions are used in the Lisp, Algol 60, Algol 68, and Scheme programming languages. 4For simplicity, we have omitted the axioms asserting that A1 and A2 are exactly the actions avai... |

1 |
Actions and other events in situation calculus 7
- McCarthy
- 2002
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...enomenon formally, and we’ll do it here in the mathematical logical language of situation calculus. Situation calculus is described in [MH69], [Sha97], [Rei01], and in the extended form used here, in =-=[McC02]-=-. Richmond Thomason in [Tho03] compares situation calculus to theories of action in the philosophical literature. As usually presented, situation calculus is a non-deterministic theory. The equation s... |