Robust Defenses for Cross-Site Request Forgery (2008)
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@MISC{Barth08robustdefenses,
author = {Adam Barth and et al.},
title = { Robust Defenses for Cross-Site Request Forgery},
year = {2008}
}
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Abstract
Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) is a widely exploited web site vulnerability. In this paper, we present a new variation on CSRF attacks, login CSRF, in which the attacker forges a cross-site request to the login form, logging the victim into the honest web site as the attacker. The severity of a login CSRF vulnerability varies by site, but it can be as severe as a cross-site scripting vulnerability. We detail three major CSRF defense techniques and find shortcomings with each technique. Although the HTTP Referer header could provide an effective defense, our experimental observation of 283,945 advertisement impressions indicates that the header is widely blocked at the network layer due to privacy concerns. Our observations do suggest, however, that the header can be used today as a reliable CSRF defense over HTTPS, making it particularly well-suited for defending against login CSRF. For the long term, we propose that browsers implement the Origin header, which provides the security benefits of the Referer header while responding to privacy concerns.
