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BAR Primer

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by Allen Clement , Harry Li , Lorenzo Alvisi , Mike Dahlin
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@MISC{Clement_barprimer,
    author = {Allen Clement and Harry Li and Lorenzo Alvisi and Mike Dahlin},
    title = {BAR Primer},
    year = {}
}

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Abstract

Byzantine and rational behaviors are increasingly recognized as unavoidable realities in today’s cooperative services. Yet, how to design BAR-tolerant protocols and rigorously prove them strategy proof remains somewhat of a mystery: existing examples tend either to focus on unrealistically simple problems or to want in rigor. The goal of this paper is to demystify the process by presenting the full algorithmic development cycle that, starting from the classic synchronous Repeated Terminating Reliable Broadcast (R-TRB) problem statement, leads to a provably BAR-tolerant solution. We show i) how to express R-TRB as a game; ii) why the strategy corresponding to the optimal Byzantine Fault Tolerant algorithm of Dolev and Strong does not guarantee safety when non-Byzantine players behave rationally; iii) how to derive a BAR-tolerant R-TRB protocol: iv) how to prove rigorously that the protocol ensures safety in the presence of non-Byzantine rational players. 1

Citations

2115 Clocks and the Ordering of Events in a Distributed System - Lamport - 1978
1069 The byzantine generals problem - Lamport, Shostak, et al. - 1982
642 Incentives build robustness in BitTorrent - Cohen - 2003
634 Managing the Commons - Hardin - 1998
583 Non-Cooperative Games - Nash - 1951
439 Free riding on Gnutella - Adar, Huberman - 2000
127 Authenticated algorithms for Byzantine agreement - Dolev, Strong - 1983
77 fault tolerance for cooperative services - BAR - 2005
56 Distributed Computing meets Game Theory: Robust Mechanisms for Rational Secret Sharing and Multiparty Computation - Abraham, Dolev, et al.
43 Specification Faithfulness in Networks with Rational Nodes - Shneidman, Parkes - 2004
42 Sustaining cooperation in multi-hop wireless networks - Mahajan, Rodrig, et al. - 2005
38 Mechanism design for policy routing - Feigenbaum, Sami, et al.
32 When selfish meets evil: Byzantine players in a virus inoculation game - Moscibroda, Schmid, et al. - 2006
27 Fault tolerant implementation - Eliaz
5 Theory of BAR games - Clement, Napper, et al. - 2007
4 Byzantine Fault-Tolerance and Beyond - Martin - 2006
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