UCL Crypto Group Universit'e catholique de Louvain
BibTeX
@MISC{Pereira_uclcrypto,
author = {Olivier Pereira and Jean-jacques Quisquater},
title = {UCL Crypto Group Universit'e catholique de Louvain},
year = {}
}
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Abstract
Abstract The A-GDH.2 and SA-GDH.2 authenticated group key agreementprotocols showed to be flawed in 2001. Even though the corresponding attacks (or some variants of them) have been rediscovered in severaldifferent frameworks, no fixed version of these protocols has been proposed until now.In this paper, we prove that it is in fact impossible to design a scalable authenticated group key agreement protocol based on the samedesign assumptions as the A-GDH ones. We proceed by providing a systematic way to derive an attack against any A-GDH-type protocolwith at least four participants and exhibit protocols with two and three participants which we cannot break using our technique. As far as weknow, this is the first generic insecurity result reported in the literature concerning authentication protocols.
