• Documents
  • Authors
  • Tables
  • Other Seers ▼
    RefSeer AckSeer CollabSeer SeerSeer
  • Log in
  • Sign up
  • MetaCart

CiteSeerX logo

Advanced Search Include Citations
Advanced Search Include Citations | Disambiguate

Algorithmic mechanism design (1999)

Cached

  • Download as a PDF

Download Links

  • [www.cs.cmu.edu]
  • [www-2.cs.cmu.edu]
  • [www-2.cs.cmu.edu]
  • [robotics.stanford.edu]
  • [www-2.cs.cmu.edu]
  • [www.cs.cmu.edu]
  • [task.stanford.edu]
  • [www.cs.huji.ac.il]
  • [www.cs.huji.ac.il]
  • [iew3.technion.ac.il]
  • [www.cs.duke.edu]
  • [www.cs.duke.edu]
  • [robotics.stanford.edu]

  • Other Repositories/Bibliography

  • DBLP
  • Save to List
  • Add to Collection
  • Correct Errors
  • Monitor Changes
by Noam Nisan , Amir Ronen
Venue:Games and Economic Behavior
Citations:480 - 16 self
  • Summary
  • Active Bibliography
  • Co-citation
  • Clustered Documents
  • Version History

BibTeX

@INPROCEEDINGS{Nisan99algorithmicmechanism,
    author = {Noam Nisan and Amir Ronen},
    title = {Algorithmic mechanism design},
    booktitle = {Games and Economic Behavior},
    year = {1999},
    pages = {129--140}
}

Years of Citing Articles

Bookmark

citeulike Connotea Bibsonomy Del.icio.us Digg Reddit

OpenURL

 

Abstract

We consider algorithmic problems in a distributed setting where the participants cannot be assumed to follow the algorithm but rather their own self-interest. As such participants, termed agents, are capable of manipulating the algorithm, the algorithm designer should ensure in advance that the agents ’ interests are best served by behaving correctly. Following notions from the field of mechanism design, we suggest a framework for studying such algorithms. Our main technical contribution concerns the study of a representative task scheduling problem for which the standard mechanism design tools do not suffice. Journal of Economic Literature

Citations

1196 An Introduction to Game Theory - Osborne - 2004
1069 The byzantine generals problem - Lamport, Shostak, et al. - 1982
954 Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders - Vickrey - 1961
556 Multipart pricing of public goods - CLARKE - 1971
500 Approximation Algorithms for NP--hard Problems - Hochbaum - 1997
441 Incentives in Teams - GROVES - 1973
286 Computationally manageable combinatorial auctions - Rothkopf, Pekeč, et al. - 1998
186 Selling spectrum rights - McMillan - 1994
185 Pricing in computer networks: Reshaping the research agenda - Shenkar, Clark, et al. - 1996
178 E.: Approximation algorithms for scheduling unrelated parallel machines - Lenstra, Shmoys, et al. - 1990
170 Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods - Green, Laffont - 1977
138 Microeconomic Theory - Mas-Collel, Whinston, et al. - 1995
119 Auction protocols for decentralized scheduling - Walsh, Wellman, et al. - 1998
111 Architecting noncooperative networks - Korilis, Lazar, et al. - 1991
111 Limitations of the vickrey auction in computational multiagent systems - Sandholm - 1996
80 Rosenschein and Gilad Zlotkin. Rules of Encounter: Designing Conventions for Automated Negotiation Among Computers - Jeffrey - 1994
71 A market protocol for decentralized task allocation - Walsh, Wellman - 1998
69 Exact and approximate algorithms for scheduling nonidentical processors - Horowitz, Sahni - 1976
52 Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract - Nisan, Ronen - 1999
39 Algorithms for selfish agents - Nisan - 1999
30 Distributed computation as an economic system - Huberman, Hogg - 1995
29 The progressive second price auction mechanism for network resource sharing - Lazar, Semret - 1998
19 The characterization of implementable choise rules - Roberts - 1979
12 On the value of information in distributed decision-making - Papadimitriou, Yannakakis - 1991
11 A dynamic theory of incentives in multi-agent systems - Shoham, Tanaka - 1997
10 Computational aspects of organization theory - Papadimitriou - 1996
9 Rosenschein and Gilad Zlotkin. Rules of Encounter: Designing Conventions for Automated Negotiation Among Computers - S - 1994
6 Papadimitriou and Mihalis Yannakakis. Linear programming without the matrix - Christos - 1993
5 Christos Nikolaou, and Yechiam Yemini. Economic models for allocating resources in computer systems - Ferguson - 1995
5 Algorithms for sel sh agents - Nisan
4 Game theoretic aspects of computing - Lineal - 1994
4 design inc. Web - Market
3 The clarke tax as a concensus mechanism among automated agents - Ephrati, Rosenschein - 1991
1 Algorithms for selfish agents. To appear - Nisan - 1999
The National Science Foundation
  • About CiteSeerX
  • Submit Documents
  • Privacy Policy
  • Help
  • Data
  • Source
  • Contact Us

Developed at and hosted by The College of Information Sciences and Technology

© 2007-2010 The Pennsylvania State University