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Mechanism Theory (2003)

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by Matthew O. Jackson
Citations:60 - 0 self
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BibTeX

@MISC{Jackson03mechanismtheory,
    author = {Matthew O. Jackson},
    title = { Mechanism Theory },
    year = {2003}
}

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Abstract

Citations

1584 Game Theory - Fudenberg, Tirole - 1991
954 Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders - Vickrey - 1961
659 Optimal Auction Design - Myerson - 1981
556 Multipart pricing of public goods - CLARKE - 1971
441 Incentives in Teams - GROVES - 1973
316 Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Bayesian - Harsanyi - 1967
279 Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading - Myerson, Satterthwaite
232 Strategy-proofness and Arrow’s conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions - Satterthwaite - 1975
171 The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure - Samuelson - 1954
170 Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods - Green, Laffont - 1977
158 Manipulation of voting schemes: a general result - Gibbard - 1973
155 Axioms of Cooperative Decision Making - Moulin - 1988
148 An efficient ascending-bid auction for multiple objects - Ausubel - 2004
126 Manipulation of voting schemes - Gibbard - 1973
124 Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem - Myerson - 1979
122 A Theory of Auctions and - Milgrom, Weber - 1982
101 Optimal auctions - Riley, Samuelson - 1981
86 Optimal Selling Strategies Under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist When Demands are - Cremer, McLean - 1985
84 and Louis-André Gérard-Varet, “Incentives and Incomplete Information - d’Aspremont
82 The characterization of implementable choice rules - Roberts - 1979
75 Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information - Holmström, Myerson - 1983
71 Multiproduct Nonlinear Pricing - Armstrong - 1996
71 Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the ‘Free Rider’ Problem - Groves - 1977
66 Incomplete Contracts: Where do we Stand - Tirole - 1999
62 The property rights doctrine and demand revelation under incomplete information - Arrow - 1979
59 On Informationally Decentralized Systems - Hurwicz - 1977
58 An Exploration in the Theory of Optimal Income Taxation - Mirrlees - 1971
58 Convergence to Efficiency in a Simple market with Incomplete - Rustichini, Satterthwaite, et al. - 1994
57 Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations - Jehiel, Moldovanu - 2001
52 Full extraction of surplus in Bayesian, dominant strategy auctions,” Econometrica - Crémer, McLean - 1988
52 A dominant strategy double auction - McAfee - 1992
46 1990]: \Asymmetric Information Bargaining Problems with Many Agents", Review of Economic Studies - Mailath, Postlewaite
45 Provision of Public Goods: Fully Implementing the Core through Private Contributions,” Review of Economic Studies - Bagnoli, Lipman - 1989
45 Multidimensional Mechanism Design for Auctions with Externalities”, mimeo - Jehiel, Moldovanu, et al. - 1996
44 Mechanism design by competing sellers - McAfee - 1993
41 Bilateral Trade with the Sealed Bid k¡Double Auction: Existence and E¢ciency - Satterthwaite, Williams - 1989
40 Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently - Cramton, Gibbons, et al. - 1987
36 Auctions and Privatization - Maskin - 1992
36 Multidimensional Incentive Compatibility and Mechanism Design - McAfee, McMillan - 1988
34 Incremental cost sharing: characterization by coalition strategy-proofness - Moulin - 1999
33 Dominant Strategy Implementation of Bayesian Incentive Compatible Allocation Rules - Mookherjee, Reichelstein - 1992
32 Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange - Papai
29 Serial cost sharing - Moulin, Shenker - 1992
27 Implementation in Differential Information Economies - Postlewaite, Schmeidler - 1986
26 Incentives and Public Inputs - Groves, Loeb - 1975
24 Random serial dictatorship and the core from random endowments in house allocation problems - Abdulkadiroˇglu, Sönmez - 1998
23 Bayesian Implementation - Jackson - 1991
23 Implementation in Environments with Complete Information - MOORE - 1992
22 Correlated information and mechanism design - McAfee, Reny - 1992
21 Voting by committees - Barberà, Sonnenschein, et al. - 1991
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