Abstract

How selfish does our evolutionary history suggest that humans will be? We explore models in which groups are formed and dissolved and where reproduction of individuals is determined by their payoffs in a game played within groups. If groups are formed “randomly”and reproductive success of group founders is determined by a multi-person prisoners ’ dilemma game, then selfish behavior will prevail over maximization of group payoffs. However, interesting models exist in which “group selection”sustains cooperative behavior. Forces that support cooperative behavior include assortative matching in groups, group longevity, and punishment-based group norms. “A selector of sufficient knowledge and power might perhaps obtain from the genes at present available in the human species a race combining an average intellect equal to that of Shakespeare with the stature of Carnera. But he could not produce a race of angels. For the moral character or for the wings he would have to await or produce suitable mutations.”... J.B.S. Haldane (Haldane 1932), p. 110

Citations