Abstract

ing of justifi cation is, in my terms, that (1) the epistemologist has to choose between (a) mind-internalist foundationalism (e.g., evidentialism), (b) mind-externalist foundationalism (e.g., process reliabilism), and (c) mind-internalist coherentism (e.g., simple coherentism), and (2) objections such as the Alternative-Systems Objection and the Isolation Objection dictate against choosing (c) and, therefore, in favor of choosing either (a) or (b). I have challenged this orthodox line on two fronts. I have argued, fi rst, that the epistemologist has a fourth option: (d) mindexternalist coherentism. I have argued, second, that mind-externalist coherentism is immune to both the Alternative-Systems Objection and the Isolation Objection—so that even if these objections are decisive against mind-internalist coherentism, it in no way follows that the epistemologist has to choose between mind-internalist foundationalism and

Citations