The Timing of Bids in Internet Auctions: Market Design, Bidder Behavior, and Artificial Agents (2002)
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by
Axel Ockenfels
,
Alvin E. Roth
| Citations: | 17 - 4 self |
BibTeX
@MISC{Ockenfels02thetiming,
author = {Axel Ockenfels and Alvin E. Roth},
title = {The Timing of Bids in Internet Auctions: Market Design, Bidder Behavior, and Artificial Agents},
year = {2002}
}
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Abstract
Many bidders in eBay employ bidding strategies that involve late bids, incremental bids, or both. Based on field evidence, we discuss the manner in which late bids are caused both by sophisticated, strategic reasoning and by irrationality and inexperience, the interaction of late bidding and incremental bidding, and the relation between market design and artificial agent design.
Citations
| 148 | Last-Minute Bidding and the Rules for Ending Second-Price Auctions - Roth, Ockenfels - 2001 |
| 81 | The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design - Alvin, Peranson - 1999 |
| 14 | An experimental analysis of ending rules in internet auctions - Ariely, Ockenfels, et al. - 2005 |
| 9 | Late Bidding in Second Price Internet Auctions: Theory and Evidence Concerning Different Rules for Ending an Auction.” Working paper - Ockenfels, Roth - 2002 |
