An Approximate Truthful Mechanism for Combinatorial Auctions with Single Parameter Agents

An Approximate Truthful Mechanism for Combinatorial Auctions with Single Parameter Agents

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by Aaron Archer , Christos Papadimitriou , Kunal Talwar , Eva Tardos

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93 - 2 self

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@MISC{Archer_anapproximate,
    author = {Aaron Archer and Christos Papadimitriou and Kunal Talwar and Eva Tardos},
    title = {An Approximate Truthful Mechanism for Combinatorial Auctions with Single Parameter Agents },
    year = {}
}

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Citations

1584	Game Theory - Fudenberg, Tirole - 1991
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954	Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders - Vickrey - 1961
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150	E.: Truthful mechanisms for one-parameter agents - Archer, Tardos - 2001
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99	Multipart pricing of public goods,” Public Choice - Clarke - 1971
94	E.: Frugal path mechanisms - Archer, Tardos - 2002
85	N.: Truthful approximation mechanisms for restricted combinatorial auctions - Mu’alem, Nisan - 2002
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31	and Éva Tardos. Truthful mechanisms for one-parameter agents - Archer
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6	Competitive Sealed Tenders,” Journal of Finance 16: 8-37. TABLE 1: EFFICIENCIES BY PERIOD AND BY EXPERIMENT Vickrey 1 Vickrey 2 Vickrey 3 Vickrey 4 - “Counterspeculation
3	Competitive auctions for multicast content. Unpublished manuscript - Goldberg, Hartline - 2000
2	Truthful mechanisms forone-parameter agents - Archer, Tardos
1	Almost-dominant strategy implementation. Unpublished manuscript - Schummer - 2001
1	Frugal path mechanisms.In SODA 2002, 991-999. [3 - Archer, Tardos - 1971
1	Truthful approximationmechanisms for restricted combinatorial auctions - Mu'alem, Nisan
1	Algorithmic mechanismdesign - Nisan, Ronen - 1999