## An Approximate Truthful Mechanism for Combinatorial Auctions with Single Parameter Agents

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Citations: | 109 - 2 self |

### BibTeX

@MISC{Archer_anapproximate,

author = {Aaron Archer and Christos Papadimitriou and Kunal Talwar and Eva Tardos},

title = {An Approximate Truthful Mechanism for Combinatorial Auctions with Single Parameter Agents },

year = {}

}

### Years of Citing Articles

### OpenURL

### Abstract

### Citations

2554 | Game Theory - Fudenberg, Tirole - 1991 |

1508 | Theory of linear and integer programming - Schrijver - 1986 |

1284 |
Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders
- Vickrey
- 1961
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...t is widely believed that high valuation is a strong indicator of how well-positioned the company is to make good use of the spectrum license [5]. The well-known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism =-=[18, 4, 9]-=- is truthful and maximizes the total valuation. However, finding the VCG allocation often requires solving an NP-hard optimization problem (e.g., in the case of single-minded bidders, the optimization... |

743 |
Multipart pricing of public goods
- Clarke
- 1971
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...t is widely believed that high valuation is a strong indicator of how well-positioned the company is to make good use of the spectrum license [5]. The well-known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism =-=[18, 4, 9]-=- is truthful and maximizes the total valuation. However, finding the VCG allocation often requires solving an NP-hard optimization problem (e.g., in the case of single-minded bidders, the optimization... |

607 |
Incentives in teams
- Groves
- 1973
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...t is widely believed that high valuation is a strong indicator of how well-positioned the company is to make good use of the spectrum license [5]. The well-known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism =-=[18, 4, 9]-=- is truthful and maximizes the total valuation. However, finding the VCG allocation often requires solving an NP-hard optimization problem (e.g., in the case of single-minded bidders, the optimization... |

569 | Algorithmic mechanism design
- Nisan, Ronen
(Show Context)
Citation Context |

332 | Ascending auctions
- Cramton
- 1998
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...nmental bodies in Europe and elsewhere to allocate spectrum licenses to mobile phone providers. The FCC auctions alone granted thousands of licenses to hundreds of companies, raising over $40 billion =-=[5]-=-. The sheer magnitude of these spectrum auctions and the rise of electronic commerce have both generated a surge of interest in designing good mechanisms for such combinatorial auctions. We will consi... |

283 |
Probabilistic construction of deterministic algorithms: approximating packing integer programs
- Raghavan
- 1988
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...(in expectation and with high probability) mechanism for the combinatorial auction problem with single parameter agents. The simple rounding algorithm can be derandomized using pessimistic estimators =-=[15]-=-. It would be interesting to see if the algorithm can be derandomized maintaining its monotonicity. Finally, this scheme gives a truthful mechanism for known single-minded bidders; an open problem is ... |

191 | Truthful mechanisms for one-parameter agents
- Archer, Tardos
- 2001
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...thfulness is so restrictive, there have been various attempts to find a weaker but still useful concept. One approach is to guarantee that truthful bidding always maximizes a player's expected profit =-=[1]-=-, i.e., the mechanism is truthful in expectation. Two orthogonal notions are that a player may benefit from lying, but not by much [17], or only with a small probability. We pursue the first and third... |

190 | Computationally Feasible VCG Mechanisms
- Nisan, Ronen
- 2000
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...PACKINGsproblem), and simply replacing the exact optimization routine required in the VCG mechanism with an approximation algorithm causes the mechanism to lose its incentive compatibility properties =-=[14]-=-. Over the last 15 to 20 years there has been a large amount of work on approximation algorithms for a huge array of hard optimization problems. However, so far there are only very few examples when a... |

190 | Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions - Lehman, O’Callaghan, et al. |

133 | Multipart pricing of public goods, Public Choice 11 - Clarke - 1971 |

132 | Competitive auctions and digital goods
- Goldberg, Hartline, et al.
- 2001
(Show Context)
Citation Context ... of truthfulness for randomized mechanisms. The strongest notion is for the mechanism to be strongly truthful This means that for every co the mechanism A// is truthful. This concept has been used in =-=[13, 3, 7, 6]-=-, but it is very restrictive. Because strong truthfulness is so restrictive, there have been various attempts to find a weaker but still useful concept. One approach is to guarantee that truthful bidd... |

114 | An Explanation in the Theory of optimum Income Taxation. The Review of Economic Studies - Mirrlees - 1971 |

112 | Frugal Path Mechanisms
- Archer, Tárdos
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...r equals her "threshold". That is, if we fix the other bids b i, then player i has some threshold bid Ti(b i) such that she wins and pays Ti(b i) if bi > Ti(b i), and loses if bismany places=-=, such as [7, 11, 1, 2, 16, 12]-=-. Analogously a randomized mechanism is truthful in expectation if and only if for every agent i, the probability p (b , b) that the mechanism assigns her the desired set S is monotone in her bid bi, ... |

99 | Truthful approximation mechanisms for restricted combinatorial auctions
- Mu’alem, Nisan
- 2002
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...single set), who give a mechanism based on a greedy allocation. Their mechanism is truthful and attains a x/-approximation to the optimal allocation, where m is the number of items. Mu'alem and Nisan =-=[12]-=- consider the case of known single-minded bidders', where the sets are known, and each agent's only private data is its valuation. They show how to combine certain truthful mechanisms into an improved... |

89 | Competitive Generalized Auctions
- Fiat, Goldberg, et al.
(Show Context)
Citation Context ... of truthfulness for randomized mechanisms. The strongest notion is for the mechanism to be strongly truthful This means that for every co the mechanism A// is truthful. This concept has been used in =-=[13, 3, 7, 6]-=-, but it is very restrictive. Because strong truthfulness is so restrictive, there have been various attempts to find a weaker but still useful concept. One approach is to guarantee that truthful bidd... |

86 | Competitive analysis of incentive compatible on-line auctions
- Lavi, Nisan
- 2000
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...le item, no truthful mechanism can always attain a guaranteed fraction of the optimal valuation, because there is no way to deal with a single astronomical bidder. Therefore, in the single item case, =-=[7, 8, 6, 10]-=- suggest comparing against variants of the VCG mechanism. We have shown that our auction achieves expected revenue approximately equal to that of the FVCG mechanism with a slightly reduced supply of g... |

75 | Truth revelation in rapid, approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
- Lehmann, O’Callaghan, et al.
- 2002
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...y few examples when approximation algorithms have turned out to be useful for designing polynomial time truthful mechanisms. One of the first such examples was due to Lehmann, O'Callaghan, and Shoham =-=[11]-=- for the case of single-minded bidders (i.e., each agent bids for a single set), who give a mechanism based on a greedy allocation. Their mechanism is truthful and attains a x/-approximation to the op... |

59 | Multidimensional Incentive Compatibility and Mechanism Design - McAfee, McMillan - 1988 |

46 | Incentivecompatible online auctions for digital goods
- Bar-Yossef, Hildrum, et al.
- 2002
(Show Context)
Citation Context ... of truthfulness for randomized mechanisms. The strongest notion is for the mechanism to be strongly truthful This means that for every co the mechanism A// is truthful. This concept has been used in =-=[13, 3, 7, 6]-=-, but it is very restrictive. Because strong truthfulness is so restrictive, there have been various attempts to find a weaker but still useful concept. One approach is to guarantee that truthful bidd... |

37 | and Éva Tardos. Truthful mechanisms for one-parameter agents - Archer - 2001 |

24 | Tardos: Frugal path mechanisms - Archer, l - 2002 |

17 | Algorithms for rational agents
- Ronen
- 2000
(Show Context)
Citation Context ... , then player i has some threshold bid T i (b -i ) such that she wins and pays T i (b -i ) if b i > T i (b -i ), and loses if b isi (b -i ). This characterization has been noted many places, such as =-=[7, 11, 1, 2, 16, 12]-=-. Analogously a randomized mechanism is truthful in expectation if and only if for every agent i, the probability p i (b -i , b i ) that the mechanism assigns her the desired set S i is monotone in he... |

10 | competitive sealed tenders. The Journal of finance, 16(1): 8–37 - Counterspeculation - 1961 |

3 |
Competitive auctions for multicast content. Unpublished manuscript
- Goldberg, Hartline
- 2000
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...le item, no truthful mechanism can always attain a guaranteed fraction of the optimal valuation, because there is no way to deal with a single astronomical bidder. Therefore, in the single item case, =-=[7, 8, 6, 10]-=- suggest comparing against variants of the VCG mechanism. We have shown that our auction achieves expected revenue approximately equal to that of the FVCG mechanism with a slightly reduced supply of g... |

2 | Truthful mechanisms forone-parameter agents - Archer, Tardos |

1 |
Almost-dominant strategy implementation. Unpublished manuscript
- Schummer
- 2001
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...that truthful bidding always maximizes a player's expected profit [1], i.e., the mechanism is truthful in expectation. Two orthogonal notions are that a player may benefit from lying, but not by much =-=[17]-=-, or only with a small probability. We pursue the first and third approaches. We say a randomized mechanism is strongly truthful with error probability # if for each b -i and each v i we have P r[v i ... |

1 | Frugal path mechanisms.In SODA 2002, 991-999. [3 - Archer, Tardos - 1971 |

1 | Truthful approximationmechanisms for restricted combinatorial auctions - Mu'alem, Nisan |

1 | Algorithmic mechanismdesign - Nisan, Ronen - 1999 |