The Battle Against Phishing: Dynamic Security Skins (2005)
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| Venue: | In SOUPS ’05: Proceedings of the 2005 symposium on Usable privacy and security |
| Citations: | 111 - 7 self |
BibTeX
@INPROCEEDINGS{Dhamija05thebattle,
author = {Rachna Dhamija},
title = {The Battle Against Phishing: Dynamic Security Skins},
booktitle = {In SOUPS ’05: Proceedings of the 2005 symposium on Usable privacy and security},
year = {2005},
pages = {77--88},
publisher = {ACM Press}
}
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Abstract
Phishing is a model problem for illustrating usability concerns of privacy and security because both system designers and attackers battle using user interfaces to guide (or misguide) users. We propose a new scheme, Dynamic Security Skins, that allows a remote web server to prove its identity in a way that is easy for a human user to verify and hard for an attacker to spoof. We describe the design of an extension to the Mozilla Firefox browser that implements this scheme. We present two novel interaction techniques to prevent spoofing. First, our browser extension provides a trusted window in the browser dedicated to username and password entry. We use a photographic image to create a trusted path between the user and this window to prevent spoofing of the window and of the text entry fields. Second, our scheme allows the remote server to generate a unique abstract image for each user and each transaction. This image creates a “skin ” that automatically customizes the browser window or the user interface elements in the content of a remote web page. Our extension allows the user’s browser to independently compute the image that it expects to receive from the server. To authenticate content from the server, the user can visually verify that the images match. We contrast our work with existing anti-phishing proposals. In contrast to other proposals, our scheme places a very low burden on the user in terms of effort, memory and time. To authenticate himself, the user has to recognize only one image and remember one low entropy password, no matter how many servers he wishes to interact with. To authenticate content from an authenticated server, the user only needs to perform one visual matching operation to compare two images. Furthermore, it places a high burden of effort on an attacker to spoof customized security indicators. 1.
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